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**The Impact of European Integration on the
Demand for Self-Government in Scotland:
A Comparative Analysis of Public Opinion 1979/1997**

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Introduction

This paper analyses the impact of European integration on the demand for self-government in Scotland at public opinion level. The analysis is based on a comparison between demand for self-government in 1979 and 1997, when the two referendums to establish an elected Scottish assembly/parliament were held¹. The first referendum failed to show sufficient support for self-government while in the second one the result was decisively in favour. The data come from public opinion surveys conducted after general elections and referendums as part of the election studies series².

The paper identifies two key aspects of the demand for devolution at mass public level. First, the existence of a significant gap between the level of support expressed in opinion polls and the one represented by vote in the referendums. Second, a close link between attitudes to devolution, i.e. self-government within the UK, and independence, i.e. secession from the UK. The existence of these two aspects indicate that the attitude to independence was a crucial determinant of support for self-government, as expressed in the referendum vote, in 1997 relative to 1979.

The paper then argues that the change in attitudes to independence does not appear to be entirely accounted for by internal UK factors. On the other hand, it identifies strong evidence that European factors had a very significant impact. It concludes by showing that the development of integration at the European level between 1979 and 1997 and the change in its perception in Scotland were the factors that most decisively modified the attitudes to independence. In turn, then, they played a crucial role in the demand for self-government in Scotland. The paper is divided into five sections. The first section introduces the research question and reviews the relevant literature. The second section analyses the demand for self-government and highlights the discrepancies between its strength at the attitudinal level and at the behavioural level. Section three identifies and discusses the link between independence and devolution. Section four explores the UK factors of the demand for self-government. Finally, section five explores the connection between attitudes to the European Union and demand for self-government and explains how European factors impacted on the demand for self-government.

¹ For an introduction to the politics of self-government in Scotland see relevant sections of Bogdanor (1999)

² These datasets are as follows: Scottish Election Study, 1979 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: The Data Archive [distributor], 1981. SN: 1604 | McCrone, D. et al., Scottish Election Survey, 1997 [computer file]. 2nd ed. Colchester, Essex: The Data Archive [distributor], 24 June 1999. SN: 3889 |

I The Research Question and the State of Research

This paper is part of a wider research project³ whose aim is to address the following question: does integration at the European level causes demand for self-government at the regional level in the member states? Within this general framework, it intends to investigate what impact membership of the EU⁴, and the development of integration at the EU level, had on the demand for self-government in Scotland, in particular whether they increased or reduced it. In this sense, Scotland and the UK represent a test case for the general hypothesis.

The question of whether integration at the supra-state level would cause 'disintegration' at the sub-state level by raising demand for regional self-government has been present in the literature on European integration for a long time⁵. However, despite being frequently mentioned, the issue has never, to my knowledge, been thoroughly investigated. This is as true for the general European question as it is for the case of the UK in particular⁶. Moreover, there is a latent disagreement in the literature on the likely effect of European integration on demand for self-government at the regional level. Most of the authors that have considered the connections between the two phenomena seem to think that European integration was (and is) a positive causal factor of sub-state demand for self-government⁷. On the other hand, for example, an empirical study of the impact of European integration on Belgium concluded that it had no effect on the demand for regional self-government⁸. Therefore, there clearly is wide scope for investigating the connections between the two phenomena in a more rigorous and comprehensive way in order to answer the wider research question.

In this respect, I chose Scotland as an ideal test case for four main reasons. First, the establishment of a Scottish parliament is the most recent and arguably the highest profile of

Jowell, R. et al., *Scottish and Welsh Referendum Studies*, 1997 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: The Data Archive [distributor], 2 December 1998. SN: 3952.

³ The project is a doctoral research conducted in the Department of Government of the London School of Economics, funded by the LSE and the ESRC (grant no R00429824368)

⁴ For the sake of consistency and clarity, throughout this paper I use the name European Union to refer to the organisation in the 1990s as well as in the 1970s, when it was officially called the European Communities and generally referred to as the European Community, the EEC or the Common Market.

⁵ See, among others, Feld (1975), Kolinsky (1981), Kellas (1991), Saint Ouen (1993), Sharpe (1993), Borrás-Alomar (1994), Loughlin (1996), John (1996).

⁶ On the impact of European integration on the vertical distribution of power in the UK see in particular Rhodes (1973-4), Kolinsky (1978), John (1996), Leicester (1998).

⁷ See Kellas (1991: 226-31), Kolinsky (1981: 86) and Urwin (1982: 67)

⁸ See De Bandt (1992).

the demand for self-government at regional level in Europe⁹. Second, there is a long history of demand for self-government in Scotland which thus allows for testing the impact of European integration as an intervening variable. Third, the existence of two very distinctive periods - culminating in the referendums of 1979 and 1997 - allows for a comparison across time in presence of change in both the independent and the dependent variable. Last, but not least, existing studies of the demand for self-government in Scotland have paid scant attention to the role of European factors¹⁰.

II The Demand for Self-Government in Scotland 1979/1997 and the Virtual/Actual Gap

There are two broad measures of demand for self-government: support for constitutional options involving different degrees of self-government and support for a Scottish assembly/parliament as expressed in the referendum votes. I refer to them as 'virtual' and 'actual' support for self-government as the former is an attitudinal measure while the latter is a behavioural one.

On the first measure, it is possible to detect three main elements. First, support for self-government versus the status quo enjoyed large majority support both in 1979 and in 1997. However, second, self-government was noticeably more popular in 1997 than in 1979. Third, within the overall measure of self-government, support for independence was dramatically higher in 1997 than twenty years earlier. The overall higher support for self-government in 1997 was thus due to the much higher popularity of independence and to the reduction of uncertainty while support for devolution actually declined [table 1].

Disaggregating by party identification, we can observe very significant changes between 1979 and 1997. Among Conservative identifiers the modal preference in 1979 was devolution in contrast with the party's perceived policy in favour of the status quo¹¹. In 1997, on the other hand, Conservative identifiers were in favour of the status quo by a large majority and were much closer to the perceived position of their party. The decline in the support for devolution thus followed the general trend while support for independence,

⁹ There is considerable disagreement in both the academic and the journalistic usage on whether Scotland should be referred to as a nation or as a region. I use the second definition in the sense of unit within a member state. Since nation is often used, albeit incorrectly, as a synonym for state I believe the word region involved less ambiguity. I thus contrast region with state rather than with nation.

¹⁰ For example, Mitchell et al. (1998) in their concise overview of the demand for self-government at public opinion level do not mention the role of European factors.

though marginally higher, remained very limited. We observe a different pattern with regard to Labour identifiers. Devolution was the preferred option at both points in time - though with weaker support in 1997 - while preferences for the status quo declined noticeably and support for independence increased dramatically. The discrepancy between the preferences of party identifiers and the policy of the party they identified with was even more remarkable in the case of Nationalists in 1979. While the party's policy had the highest visibility of all - 86 per cent perceived it correctly - its identifiers actually preferred devolution to independence by a non negligible margin. This spectacular discrepancy declined between 1979 and 1997 but did not completely disappear. At the latter timepoint, Nationalist identifiers were more in favour of independence within the EU and less in favour of independence outside the EU than the perceived position of the party. Overall, support for independence almost doubled among Nationalists between 1979 and 1997. In sum, we can see that virtual demand for self-government declined among Conservative identifiers, increased among Labour identifiers and remained broadly stable among Nationalist identifiers. However, in both the latter two cases support for devolution declined and support for independence augmented. Notably, support for independence increased in absolute terms almost as much among Labour identifiers as among Nationalist identifiers and in relative terms seven times as fast among the former as among the latter [table 1].

In terms of the perception of party positions on self-government, we can observe a process of polarisation taking place between 1979 and 1997. The Conservative party became more strongly associated with the status quo and the Labour party with devolution, in each case two thirds of respondents correctly identified the party position in 1997. However, it seems that the SNP was not entirely successful in enhancing the visibility of its 'Independence in Europe' position as a substantial 33 per cent of respondents thought the party was standing for independence outside the European Union [table 2].

Actual support for self-government - measured by vote in the two referendums - was substantially different between the two time-points¹²[table 3]. The Yes vote increased more than twenty points while the No vote, including those who did not vote in 1979 but favoured the No side, declined by 27 percentage points. The change in the actual support for self-government was thus much stronger than the change which took place at the level of virtual support. Disaggregating the data by party identification, moreover, it emerges that the change was highly concentrated among Labour identifiers while the voting pattern of both

¹¹ The perception of party positions on self-government is discussed in the next paragraph

Conservative and, especially, Nationalist identifiers remained broadly stable. Among Labour identifiers the vote 'swing' between 1979 and 1997 was more than twenty percentage points.

What also emerges from these data is that actual support for devolution was in fact negative in 1979 even though the referendum result showed a narrow positive margin¹³. The difference is accounted for by the effect that the 40 per cent rule¹⁴ had on the decision to abstain from voting in the referendum. As showed by the data reported in the table 3, those who did not vote were twice as likely to favour the No vote than the Yes vote which indicate that many opponents of devolution chose to abstain in the knowledge that, by virtue of the 40 per cent rule, their abstention would have favoured the No side. If the percentage of No votes and that of non voters favouring No are combined it becomes clear that the overall actual support for a Scottish assembly was negative in 1979. This interpretation is confirmed by additional data on the electorate's own interpretation of the referendum result. As shown in table 4, the prevailing interpretation was that the result showed that the Scottish people did not want an assembly.

In contrast with the previous measures that indicate a significant increase in the demand for self-government - both at an attitudinal and at a behavioural levels - the perceived importance of self-government as a political issue at the time of the general election, shows a decrease in the salience of the issue. In particular, as the data in table 5 indicate, the decrease occurred for all three groups of party identifiers but it was much stronger for Nationalist and Conservative identifiers than for Labour identifiers. Not surprisingly, however, the perceived importance of self-government was positively correlated with the demand for it, so the importance of the issue was highest among Nationalist identifiers and lowest among Conservative identifiers both in 1979 and in 1997.

The virtual/actual support gap

I refer to the difference between the attitudinal support for self-government and the behavioural one as the 'virtual/actual support gap'¹⁵. As summarised in table 6, this gap was

¹² On the 1979 referendum, see Watt (1979), Perman (1979), Balsom and McAllister (1979), Bochel et al. (1981), Proctor (1982) and Brand (1986); on the 1997 referendum see Jones (1997a, 1997b), Mitchell et al. (1998), Pattie et al. (1998) and Pattie et al. (1999).

¹³ On the prevailing interpretation of the referendum result as 'indecisive', see Perman (1979: 63), Balsom and McAllister (1979: 401)

¹⁴ The 40 per cent rule stipulated that at least 40 per cent of the eligible voters had to vote in favour of devolution for the latter to be implemented, see Bogdanor (1980 and 1999: 186-89).

¹⁵ The idea of virtual/actual support gap can also be found, in more general terms, in Watt (1979: 145), Perman (1979: 53) and Mitchell et al. (1998: 166).

much wider in 1979 than in 1997. In 1979, taking into account those who did not vote but favoured a Yes vote, the Yes vote commanded 39 per cent against a 61 per cent 'virtual' support for self-government. In contrast, in 1997 75 per cent of those who took part in the referendum voted Yes which compares with a 78 per cent virtual support for self-government. In other words, many who supported self-government in theory did actually vote against the assembly in the 1979 referendum or abstained in the knowledge that they would favour the No side. In contrast, those who were virtually in favour of self-government in 1997 voted overwhelmingly Yes in the referendum. To further analyse the nature of this gap I disaggregated the data by degrees of virtual support for self-government. Table 7 shows that less than 50 per cent of virtual supporters of self-government voted Yes in the referendum in 1979 against 70 per cent who did so in 1997. While the percentage of non voters stayed exactly the same, 26 per cent voted No against only 5 per cent in 1997. Moreover, the table shows that the virtual/actual support gap in 1979 is accounted only marginally by the behaviour of those in favour of independence. Despite the distance between the self-government capabilities of the proposed Scottish assembly and their own preferences, together with the ambiguous attitude of the SNP towards it¹⁶, 68 per cent of them voted Yes. This compares with a 75 per cent positive vote in 1997 and clearly indicate that supporters of independence were almost as ready to support a Scottish assembly in 1979 as they were to support a Scottish parliament in 1997. The group most responsible for the virtual/actual support gap in 1979 emerge as being those who virtually supported devolution. Only 46 per cent of them voted Yes in the referendum against 28 voting No while those who did not vote were more likely to favour a No vote than a Yes vote. These data compare to a 65 per cent Yes vote and a 7 per cent No vote in 1997. The virtual/actual support gap in 1979 was thus almost entirely attributable to the decisions of those who were in favour of devolution at the attitudinal level.

Moving one step further and disaggregating the data between supporters of the two devolution options - assembly and parliament - allows us to further identify those virtually supporting the assembly as the 'culprits' for the gap between virtual and actual support. As indicated in table 8, supporters of the parliament option voted decisively Yes in the referendum and those who did not vote were slightly more likely to favour the Yes side. In stark contrast, a plurality of those in favour of the assembly option actually voted No in the referendum and those who did not vote were more than twice as likely to favour a No vote than a Yes vote. Therefore, we are confronted with the remarkable paradox that those

¹⁶ See, among others, Levy (1986).

theoretically in favour of the option closest to the one put to the vote in the referendum were, remarkably, those most responsible for voting against it.

It thus appears that the gap between virtual and actual support for self-government in 1979 and by consequence the rejection of the Scottish assembly in presence of a very consistent long-term virtual support for self-government, was caused by a plurality - or a majority if those who did not vote but had a preference are included - of virtual supporters of the assembly option voting No in the referendum. The key question is therefore why the group who should have found the referendum proposal closest to its own preferences actually rejected it.

The literature on the 1979 referendum does not directly address the issue of the gap between virtual and actual support in terms presented in this paper but it considers the puzzle of the referendum result relative to the long-term strength of self-government demand, for which it offers five main explanations. First, as the devolution proposals were the product of one party and the assembly was to be elected by the first-past-the-post system, the assembly was perceived as being a self-interested Labour plot. Secondly, this perception of the assembly produced a polarisation by party position and linked the fate of the proposals to the popularity of the Labour party and of the government. As the referendum came at the end of the 1974-1979 parliament, after a period of deep government unpopularity, and with a divided Labour party, negative attitudes to the party and to the government influenced the referendum vote. The combination of these two effects caused the decline of support among Conservative identifiers and may also account for some disaffection among Labour identifiers¹⁷. Thirdly, the devolution proposals did not satisfy the demand for real devolution of power in particular because the assembly lacked substantial economic and fiscal powers¹⁸. Fourthly, the strength of the SNP which had been a major spur to the devolution programme was perceived to have declined since mid-1978. This undermined the need for a Scottish assembly in the eyes of reluctant supporters¹⁹. Lastly, but most importantly, the No campaign was better organised and better financed than the Yes campaign and the turnout was low²⁰.

In contrast, studies of the second referendum emphasise the many differences between 1997 and 1979²¹. For a start the overall context of the demand for devolution was different due to the 'democratic deficit' created by the long Conservative rule and to the higher consensus on the issue in the civil society, which produced the proposals of the

¹⁷ See Balsom and McAllister (1979) and Brand (1986).

¹⁸ See Watt (1979) and Perman (1979)

¹⁹ Balsom and McAllister (1979)

²⁰ See, in particular, Perman (1979) and Balsom and McAllister (1979)

²¹ On the 1997 referendum, see references at note 10 above

Constitutional Convention²². Moreover, first, the Labour party and its leader were much more united behind the policy, much stronger in parliament and much more popular²³. Secondly, the proposals were much better than in 1979, notably because they included some fiscal powers and provisions for proportional representation in parliament²⁴. Thirdly, the media were more supportive of the Yes side while business was less supportive of the No side²⁵. Finally, and more generally, the Yes campaign was better organised and better funded than the No campaign²⁶. As a result, support for self-government as measured by voting intentions for the referendum did not decline significantly during the campaign as it did in 1979 and ensured the acceptance of the proposals²⁷.

While most of these arguments possess high degrees of plausibility²⁸, they do not seem to provide a conclusive explanation for the virtual/actual support gap not least because they were not intended to do so in the first place. They primarily focus on the decline (or lack thereof) of support for an assembly/parliament in the run up to the referendums rather than on the gap between support for self-government as implied by constitutional preferences and support for self-government expressed in the referendum vote at the time of the referendums. As seen above, despite the decline which took place between 1974 and 1979 and, particularly in the last few months before the March referendum²⁹, virtual support for self-government was still positive in 1979 while actual support for the assembly was negative, i.e. there was a large virtual/actual gap. In 1997, both measures were highly positive and the gap between the two was minimal. I would argue that the different size of this gap was the crucial variable determining the referendum results and by extension the success of devolution in 1997 as opposed to its failure in 1979.

From this contention, two crucial questions arise. What account for the fact that the gap between virtual and actual support was much larger in 1979 and in 1997 and had the process of European integration anything to do with that? To answer these questions, the paper proposes a two level explanatory model based on the interaction between attitudes to independence and attitudes to devolution at the internal level and the impact of European integration on the attitudes to independence at the external level. The contention is that by

²² Mitchell et al. (1998: 178)

²³ Ibidem (176)

²⁴ Ibidem (168)

²⁵ Ibidem (175, 179)

²⁶ Jones (1997a), Mitchell et al. (1998)

²⁷ Pattie et al. (1998: 8)

²⁸ The decline of support among Conservative identifiers and the imbalance in the campaign appear as the strongest ones, but the claims that voters rejected the assembly because it lacked powers or because the turnout was low are not borne out by the evidence presented in this paper as supporters of stronger self-government options voted decisively Yes and those who did not vote were more likely to favour the No side than the Yes side.

incorporating a crucial external dimension, missing in all other explanations of both the 1979 gap and the differences between 1979 and 1997, this model contributes significantly to our understanding of the demand for self-government in Scotland and of the impact of European integration on it.

III The Interaction Effect between Independence and Devolution

The interaction effect between attitudes to devolution and attitudes to independence can be defined in the following terms: since the establishment of a Scottish assembly/parliament was widely seen as a likely first step towards eventual independence³⁰, support for it was not only dictated by attitudes to devolution but also, crucially, by attitudes to independence. Overall, thus, support for an assembly/parliament was determined by the interaction of the attitudes towards devolution and independence, in particular by the perceived probability that the former would lead to the latter. Formally:

$$ADsg = VDd f \{ [Ud - p(Ui)] - Us \} + VDi f [Ui - (Ud + Us)] \quad \text{with } U^* = (B^* - C^*)$$

Where the actual demand for self-government defined as the demand for a Scottish parliament [ADsg] is equal to the virtual demand for devolution [VDd] - which is a function of the perceived utility of devolution [Ud] *minus the perceived utility of independence [Ui] discounted by the perceived probability [p] that devolution would lead to independence* minus the perceived utility of the status quo [Us] - plus the virtual demand for independence [Di] - which is a function of the perceived utility of independence [Ui] minus the sum of the perceived utilities of devolution [Ud] and of the status quo [Us]; and where all perceived utilities are the result of the difference between the perceived benefits and the perceived costs of each constitutional status.

The key aspect here is that support for the two forms of self-government showed conflicting signs, most notably in 1979. Positive attitudes to devolution co-existed with negative attitudes to independence. In the case of virtual support for self-government as measured by preferences on constitutional statuses, the two forms of support could be kept distinct and

²⁹ See Balsom and McAllister (1979)

³⁰ Virtually all accounts of the rise in the political saliency of the demand for Scottish self-government and of the reactions of British governments emphasise the triggering role of the rising electoral support for the SNP whose fundamental policy goal was (and is) the secession of Scotland from the United Kingdom. For two examples, see Balsom and McAllister (1979: 395-6) and Mitchell et al.

resulted in strong support for devolution and limited support for independence. Obviously, support for the two options could not be kept separate in the case of a referendum vote and this is why the latter was determined by the interaction of the attitudes towards both devolution and independence, even if independence was not as such an issue in the referendum. This is the mechanism that I refer to as the interaction effect.

A corollary of the existence of this interaction effect, is also that we should expect those favouring the lowest option of self-government - in 1979 the assembly option -, i.e. the one most distant from the independence option, to be those most opposed to independence. If the latter was perceived as a highly probable outcome of a Yes vote in the referendum, then it follows that we should expect those favouring the assembly option to have been the ones most likely to vote No in the referendum. This prediction is consistent with the empirical evidence identified in the previous section and thus supports the hypothesis that the existence of an interaction effect between devolution and independence explains the apparent paradox of the gap between constitutional preferences and referendum vote of devolution supporters. Moreover, by virtue of this interaction effect, another feature of the referendum vote was that the true choice was not between devolution and the status quo but between devolution combined with the probability that it would lead to independence and the status quo. There are thus two crucial elements in the interaction effect between independence and devolution: the perception of the probability that the latter would lead to the former and subsequent assessment of the relative benefits/costs balance of independence versus the status quo. In this respect, an important aspect is that the higher the perceived probability of the nexus between independence and devolution the higher the likelihood that the crucial determinant of the referendum vote was the assessment of the utility of the status quo versus the utility of independence instead of that of devolution itself.

As regards the first aspect, the available evidence suggests that at both points in time the probability that devolution would lead to independence was perceived to be very high. As the data in table 9 indicate, a break-up of the UK was considered to be the main disadvantage of devolution in 1979. Furthermore, it was particularly so for those opposing self-government *in toto* and for those supporting the weakest self-government option. Notably, there is only the slightest difference between these two groups in the extent to which they perceived devolution as leading to independence. It therefore appears that the fear that devolution would be a stepping stone to independence was a crucial determinant of opposition to self-government. In this light we can appreciate the dilemma of the supporters of the assembly option who were in the uncomfortable position of being in favour of a limited degree of self-

(1998: 166-8); on the connections between support for the SNP and demand for self-government in

government while being acutely aware that that limited degree of self-government was highly likely to turn into a maximum degree of self-government. Evidence that perception of the probability of this linkage was a crucial factor in the referendum vote is provided by table 10 which shows that those virtual supporters of self-government who voted No in the referendum were much more likely to think that the break up of the UK was the most important disadvantage of devolution and that the same pattern was reinforced in the case of virtual supporters of the assembly option. Additional support for the claim that the probability of devolution leading to independence was perceived as being very high and that it played a large role in shaping the referendum vote is provided by the abundant qualitative evidence that the break-up of the UK was the key issue in the campaign and that the divisions in the Yes camp were largely dictated by the different interpretation of the purpose of devolution between Labour and the SNP³¹.

As regards the 1997 referendum, the available data refer to the preferences on the most important thing the future Scottish parliament should not do³². In a similar pattern to the data for 1979, secession of Scotland is considered to be by far the most important decision the parliament should avoid. Again, likewise 1979, the data disaggregated by referendum vote reveal a very significant gap between the attitudes of actual supporters and opponents of self-government on this issue: the latter are almost twice as likely as the former to think so [table 11]. In sum, there is substantial evidence that the break up of the UK was perceived as the main cost of devolution in both 1979 and 1997. Therefore it follows that the probability that devolution would lead to independence was perceived to be very high at both points. This evidence supports the existence of the first aspect of the interaction effect: the perception that devolution was highly likely to lead to independence and indicates that such perceived probability remained broadly constant between the two time-points.

I now turn to the second aspect of the interaction effect: the hypothesis that as devolution was perceived to lead to independence, the crucial determinant of the referendum vote was the assessment of the utility of the status quo versus the utility of independence. Moreover, that such an assessment on the part of the virtual supporters of the assembly option in 1979 provide a robust explanation of why a large percentage of them voted No in the referendum. Data in table 12 show that independence was perceived in more negative terms - i.e. as involving lower utility - than the status quo by virtual supporters of devolution. In particular, a very limited change to the status quo such as having the Scottish MPs meeting in Scotland

the 1970s, see Miller et al. (1977).

³¹ See Perman (1979: 56-59), Balsom and McAllister (1979: 397-9) and Macartney (1981).

rather than in London was strongly preferred to independence and even no change at all in the way Scotland was governed was still preferred to independence. As seen for previous variables, the same pattern is reinforced among virtual supporters of the assembly option. In this case, not only was no change at all largely preferred to independence but the option of having Scottish MPs meeting in Scotland was actually judged in slightly positive terms. It thus emerges that supporters of devolution if faced with the ultimate choice between status quo and independence preferred the status quo. Assembly supporters very strongly so. These results thus provide support to the hypothesis that a large number of virtual supporters of devolution voted No in the 1979 referendum because they thought devolution was highly likely to lead to independence and they had a much more negative opinion of the latter than of the status quo.

Additional, indirect, evidence in support for this explanation is given by the responses to the question of the role of the SNP in the politics of self-government. As shown in table 13, a plurality of respondents perceived the SNP as having had a negative effect on the achievement of devolved self-government by linking devolution to secession from the UK. In particular, both Conservative and Labour identifiers were twice as likely to think that the SNP delayed devolution by frightening off those who feared separation than to think that it speeded up devolution and a substantial 35 per cent of Nationalist identifiers thought likewise. As mentioned in section II above, a similar plurality interpreted the referendum result as showing that Scottish citizens did not really want an assembly in 1979.

The situation was radically different in 1997. For this second point in time, actual data on the second preference of supporters of devolution are available. As table 14 indicate, in 1997 supporters of devolution were almost twice as likely to prefer independence to the status quo. Crucially, Labour identifiers in particular were twice as likely to prefer independence to the status quo and only the very small group of Conservative identifiers expressed a reverse preference. Thus, the interaction effect was still present in 1979 but the perception of one of the terms was radically different.

From the comparison between the data for 1979 and 1997 a key difference between the two referendums thus emerges: at the first point in time, virtual supporters of devolution preferred the status quo to independence whereas at the second point in time the reverse was true.

³² Despite the slightly different format of the two variables, I believe they should both provide reliable estimations of the perceived underlying connection between independence and devolution.

A central contention of this paper is that, by virtue of the interaction effect, this difference is the key to the explanation of the gap between virtual and actual support for self-government in 1979 and hence to the explanation of the failure of devolution in 1979 and its success in 1997 in presence of a fairly steady, long-term majority support for self-government in Scotland.

From the analysis presented above, it follows that the attitude to independence emerges as the key determinant of the demand for self-government at public opinion level. As discussed in the first part of this section, the perceived utility of the independence option is made up of the assessment of the benefits/costs balance of being independent against the benefits/costs balance of remaining within the UK. In turn, the utility of being independent is determined by the perception of the international, notably the European, environment while the utility of remaining within the UK is determined by the perception of the UK system. From this premiss, a crucial question arises: was the much less negative perception of independence in 1997 relative to 1979 primarily determined by an improvement in the perceived benefits/costs of the international environment or by a worsening of the perceived benefits/costs of the UK system? I deal with these two aspects in the following sections, starting with the perception of the UK system and focusing on the perception of the European Union as regards the international environment, on the ground that the EU was the most important feature of the international environment for an hypothetically independent Scotland.

IV Support for the UK and Demand for Self-Government

As seen in section II, current explanations for the success of devolution in 1997 relative to its failure in 1979 are exclusively based on internal UK factors, in particular on the rise in the demand for self-government as a consequence of the democratic deficit created by eighteen years of Conservative rule which only had minority support in Scotland and by the greater effectiveness of the Yes side in the referendum campaign. By extension, we should expect that the higher demand for self-government in 1997 was primarily or exclusively the result of a change in the perception of the UK system rather than of a change in the perception of the international environment. However, the analysis of the connections between attitudes towards the UK political system and the demand for self-government casts several doubts on such an interpretation, as this section aims to show.

To assess the extent to which the demand for self-government was determined by internal factors, i.e. by attitudes towards the UK political system, I use three variables: satisfaction with government, the perception of Scotland's economic situation within the UK and the primary identification with the UK rather than with Scotland. The first one measures whether

the respondents were satisfied with the performance of the UK political institutions, the second one measures whether respondents thought Scotland was poorer or richer compared to other parts of the UK and the last one measures whether respondents identify primarily with the UK or with Scotland. I believe these variables provide robust estimations of three main aspects of political support for the UK: politico-institutional, economic and symbolico-affective. These descriptive measures are summarised in table 15.

Satisfaction with the UK government declined from a positive level in 1979 to a slightly negative one in 1997. At both time points, Conservative identifiers were the most satisfied and Nationalist identifiers the most dissatisfied with Labour identifiers in an intermediate position between the two other groups. The most significant change took place among the latter for whom satisfaction with government turned negative in 1997. Rather surprisingly after 18 years of Conservative rule, satisfaction with government dropped most dramatically among Conservative identifiers while among Nationalist identifiers, equally surprisingly, satisfaction with government actually improved between 1979 and 1997.

We can observe an opposite trend as regards the perception of Scotland's economic situation within the UK. Though this was negative both in 1979 and in 1997, it improved markedly between the two timepoints. Not surprisingly in this case, it did so most notably among Conservative identifiers, for whom the perception actually turned positive in 1997 but overall the improvement occurred across party identifications. Thus it appears that Scots were much less negative about their country's economic situation in 1997 than they were eighteen years earlier.

Identification with the UK followed a third type of pattern: it was already negative in 1979 and it became more so in 1997. At both points in time Conservative identifiers expressed a primary identification with the UK in contrast to both Labour and Nationalist identifiers who primarily identified with Scotland. The most significant decline in identification with the UK took place among Labour identifiers while the decline was marginal among Nationalists. In the case of the Conservative identifiers, primary identification with the UK actually increased significantly between 1979 and 1997.

Overall, support for the economic aspects of the UK political system increased between 1979 and 1997 while support for both the politico-institutional and the symbolico-affective aspects declined. These trends combined produced a 1997 situation where all three measures of support for the UK political system in Scotland were negative. Disaggregating by party identification, Conservative identifiers expressed positive support for all three aspects while both Labour and Nationalist identifiers had negative attitudes across the three measures of political support for the UK.

Table 16 shows the correlations between each aspect of the support for the UK and the demand for self-government. The two strongest determinants of the virtual demand for self-government in 1979 were primary identification with Scotland and dissatisfaction with the UK government followed by negative perception of the economic situation of Scotland relative to other parts of the UK. A broadly similar pattern can be identified at the level of actual support where the strongest predictor is again primary identification with Scotland. Somewhat surprisingly then, despite the deep dissatisfaction with Scotland's economic situation economic factors do not appear to have been powerful determinants of the demand for self-government in 1979. In contrast, economic dissatisfaction was a better predictor of the demand for self-government in 1997 than dissatisfaction with the UK government both at the virtual and, particularly so, at the actual level. However, the strongest determinant of the demand for self-government in 1997 as in 1979 was primary identification with Scotland. Overall thus, demand for self-government seems to have been primarily determined by lack of identification with the UK at both points in time while economic dissatisfaction seems to having had a stronger influence on the demand for self-government in 1997 than in 1979 and politico-institutional dissatisfaction more significant in 1979 than in 1997.

These results, declining identification with the UK apart, are not consistent with the prevailing explanation that higher actual support for devolution in 1997 was primarily due to internal UK factors, notably 'non-legitimate' Conservative rule. Assuming that was the case, we should expect four phenomena to have occurred between 1979 and 1997: a sharp decline in the satisfaction with government among non-Conservative identifiers, dissatisfaction with government being a stronger determinant of demand for self-government in 1997 than in 1979, a higher demand for devolution and a higher importance of self-government as a political issue. Unfortunately, I have found no evidence that these phenomena took place. First and foremost, the decline in the satisfaction with the UK government was actually sharpest among Conservative identifiers while among Nationalists satisfaction actually went up [table 15]. Secondly, dissatisfaction with government was a weaker predictor of the demand for self-government in 1997 than in 1979 [table 16]. Thirdly, virtual support for devolution actually declined between the two time points from 54 to 43 per cent and the overall higher virtual support for self-government to be observed for 1997 was almost entirely due to the much higher support for independence [table 1]. Likewise, fourthly, the perceived importance of self-government as a political issue declined between 1979 and 1997, most notably among Nationalist identifiers but also among Labour ones [table 5].

Taken together, these four factors do not support the hypothesis that higher actual demand for self-government in 1997 was primarily the result of internal UK factors. However, what seems to have played an important role is the decline in identification with the UK which took

place over the period. This was particularly sharp among Labour identifiers, as seen above the only group of party identifiers among whom the virtual/actual gap changed significantly between 1979 and 1997. Moreover, lack of identification with the UK was a stronger determinant of the demand for self-government in 1997 than it was in 1979 besides being at both timepoints its most powerful determinant. The decline in identification with the UK thus appears to be the only unambiguously significant UK factor in accounting for the higher actual demand for self-government in 1997 relative to 1979. It is plausible that the much more favourable perception of independence may have been a function of the lower identification with the UK on the basis that the lower the affective support for the UK, the lower the symbolico-affective costs of seceding from it. However, this factor is unlikely to have been the only or even the main one in changing the perception of the utility of independence as there is strong evidence that external factors, namely European ones, played a significant role. I discuss them in the following section.

V Support for the EU and Demand for Self-Government

To assess to what extent the demand for self-government was determined by attitudes towards the European Union I use three variables: satisfaction with membership of the EU, support for the Social Charter and identification with Europe. The first one measures whether respondents thought UK's membership of the EU was good or bad for Scotland, the second one measures whether respondents were in favour of the UK signing the EU's Social Charter and the third one measures whether respondents thought of themselves as Europeans. In a similar way to the variables used in the previous section to measure support for the UK, these three variables are intended as estimators of three main aspects of political support for the EU: economic, political and symbolico-affective. Satisfaction with membership of the EU, which is largely a measure of economic support³³, is the only variable available for both 1979 and 1997 and is thus the most important for the analysis carried out in this section. However, the other two variables, which measure support for aspects of the EU largely absent in the 1970s allowed me to identify important connections between the phenomena under investigation.

Support for the EU

Satisfaction with EU membership increased very substantially between the two timepoints turning from negative levels in 1979 to positive ones in 1997. The increase was largest

among Nationalist identifiers who passed from being the least supportive of EU membership to being the most supportive. Though on a more limited scale, the change was also dramatic among Labour identifiers while Conservative ones further increased their already positive support for membership. In 1997 there was a broadly consistent level of positive support for membership of the EU across party identification in contrast to 1979 when there existed a wide gap between the positive support expressed by Conservative identifiers and the deeply negative one to be found among both Labour and, especially, Nationalist identifiers. Since, as mentioned above, this variable largely measures satisfaction with the economic aspect of the European Union, what emerges from these results is that the perception of the economic benefits for Scotland of belonging to the EU changed dramatically between 1979 and 1997. By the latter date it appears that a broad consensus existed that the economic effects of European integration were positive for Scotland [table 17]. Such a consensus did not clearly exist as regards the attitudes towards the Social Charter³⁴. In this case we can observe a sharp divide between Conservative identifiers on the one hand and Labour and Nationalist identifiers on the other hand. The former were strongly opposed to it while the latter two were strongly in favour. Overall, there was positive support for the social aspect of membership of the EU though on a lower level than support for the economic aspects. However, this lower level was almost entirely attributable to the opposition of Conservative identifiers. From this observation it emerges that there was a very high degree of consistency between support for the economic and social aspects of the EU among both Labour and Nationalist identifiers while in the case of Conservative identifiers the two aspects were sharply opposed: strong support for the economic element coexisted with strong opposition to the social element [table 17]. Finally, there was an extremely low degree of affective support for the European Union as measured by identification with Europe. Variation across party identifications was very limited though, somewhat surprisingly, Conservative identifiers expressed the least negative support and Labour identifiers were the most negative. Overall, the picture that emerges is one of fairly solid support for the economic and social aspects of the European Union in 1997 and an extremely negative degree of support for its symbolico-affective elements. In terms of the utilitarian/affective dichotomy of support for political systems³⁵, one can thus affirm that positive support for the

³³ The role of economic factors in determining satisfaction with membership of the European Union has been comprehensively demonstrated by Gabel (1998a, 1998b).

³⁴ The Social Charter was an agreement to add a 'social dimension' to the single market programme that the British Conservative government refused to sign in 1989 and was subsequently added as a chapter to the Maastricht treaty in 1992 covering the other 11 member states. The Social Charter was an issue during the election campaign of 1997 with the Labour party committed to signing up. On the social dimension of the single market programme, see Teague (1989) and Streeck (1996).

³⁵ The concepts of utilitarian and affective support are derived from Easton's (1975) categories of specific and diffuse support

EU in Scotland was exclusively utilitarian in the late 1990s. Yet, this represents a very significant change relative to 1979 when, as seen above, attitudes to the economic aspects of the EU were negative.

Connections between support for the EU and support for the UK

By analysing the association between support for the EU and support for the UK it is possible to identify how these two wider political systems in which Scotland is nested were perceived in relation to each other. As table 18 shows, we can see that support for membership of the EU in 1979 was in positive correlation with all three measures of support for the UK. In particular, the correlation was strongest - and highly significant statistically - with satisfaction with the UK government. These results seem to indicate that the EU was then perceived as essentially complementary to the UK. Bearing in mind that at that time the EU was almost exclusively considered as an economic organisation rather than a political system, this perceived complementarity was probably due to the fact that the EU and the UK were seen as broadly sharing the same economic features. Moving on to 1997, we can observe that satisfaction with membership of the EU remained in fairly strong positive association with support for the UK, in particular with satisfaction with government and positive assessment of the economic benefits for Scotland of belonging to the UK. In this case we can thus see that the economic aspects of the European Union were still perceived as being broadly consistent with those of the UK, in much the same way as in 1979. On the contrary, support for the Social Charter was negatively correlated with all measures of support for the UK, notably satisfaction with government and satisfaction with democracy. These results seem to indicate that the social aspects of the European Union were perceived as being in opposition to the main features of the UK political system thus creating a situation where those who favoured the type of social policies adopted at the EU level were very critical of the UK political system. These data broadly confirm the findings discussed above on the distribution of attitudes towards the UK by party identification. The last measure of support for the EU - identification with Europe - on the other hand, was not in significant association with any variable measuring support for the UK, either substantially or statistically. In particular, identification with Europe was not correlated with primary identification with Scotland. This set of data, together with the fact that the two other measures of support for the EU in 1997 were also not associated with primary identification with the UK provide solid evidence that the affective support for the UK political system was unaffected by the European dimension and that affective support for the EU was largely irrelevant in relation to all the other variables. In sum, these results seem to indicate that the EU was seen as being complementary to the UK in 1979 while in 1997 the perception was

split. On the one hand, it was perceived as complementary as far as the economic aspects were concerned, on the other hand the EU social - and, by extension, political - dimension was perceived as being alternative to the UK's one.

How the perception of the EU changed

First of all, it is important to bear in mind that the general perception of the European Union, in Scotland as in the rest of the UK changed from being 'uni-dimensional' in the late 1970s to being 'pluri-dimensional' in the 1990s. By uni-dimensional I indicate the fact that the EU was perceived almost exclusively as an economic organisation with very little visibility for its political and identity aspects. On the contrary, in the 1990s, the political aspects of the EU and, to a far lesser extent, its identity aspects had acquired a much higher profile thus bringing about a 'pluri-dimensional' nature, which, as shown by the data on attitudes to the economic and the social aspects, often combined contrasting attitudes. This change from uni-dimensional to pluri-dimensional was the result of two concomitant trends: the development at the EU level of the social and symbolico-affective dimensions of the process of European integration that had remained subdued until the late 1970s and the growing awareness of these developments and of the political elements that had already been there on the part of the Scottish and British public opinion.

Given its uni-dimensional perception as an economic organisation, support for EU membership in 1979 was essentially dictated by attitudes to the type of economic integration the EU was based on namely, free trade and market liberalisation. It was thus supported by liberal and conservative parties and opposed by socialist and social-democratic parties. Evidence for this can be found in the sharp differences in support for EU membership in 1979 between Conservative identifiers on the one hand and Labour and Nationalist³⁶ identifiers on the other which seem to indicate that these attitudes were largely determined by ideological positions towards economic issues. It was thus supported by middle class voters likely to identify with the Conservative party and opposed by working class voters likely to identify with the Labour party and the SNP. On the left of the political spectrum, the EU was seen as a free-market, capitalist organisation, fostering a form of economic integration which was in the interest of the 'core areas' of Europe (including south-eastern England) and against those of peripheral areas such as Scotland³⁷. Since the demand for self-government was largely concentrated among the left-of-centre and left-wing political

³⁶ There is large consensus that the SNP was (and is) a social-democratic party, see for example the relevant chapter in Bennie et al. (1997); for this reason it is here associated with Labour

³⁷ On the different perceptions of the effects of economic integration see Leonardi (1993)

opinion, it follows that those demanding self-government had a negative opinion of the EU on the grounds of ideological opposition to free-market, capitalist economic integration and, more particularly, of the expected negative effects of the latter on Scotland's economy and society³⁸. Moreover, Nationalist identifiers perceived the EU as a natural economic extension of the UK rather than as an alternative system and judged it as negatively.

As mentioned above, support for the EU in 1997 was pluri-dimensional, constituted at least by two discrete elements: attitudes to economic integration and attitudes to political integration, especially to the social dimension. As shown by the data in table 17, attitudes to the two issues were in conflict for Conservative identifiers but consistent among Labour and Nationalist identifiers. Therefore, not only did the left-of -centre public opinion supported the EU social policy - rather predictably - but they also crucially changed their perception of economic integration. From perceiving it as a threat to Scotland they came to view it as an opportunity for Scotland. As the opposition to the EU in the 1970s was based on both ideological grounds and on the expected impact on Scotland so the change in attitudes took place at both the ideological and the empirical levels. Left-of-centre public opinion in Scotland, like elsewhere in Europe, largely came to terms with the liberal capitalist system and with the process of economic integration in Europe³⁹. At the empirical level, Scotland's ability to improve its economic situation in the face of deepening economic integration on a European scale is likely to have determined the attitudinal change. As regards the EU social policy, by developing new policies which had strong support in Scotland, the process of integration moved the policy output of the EU closer to the preferences of the median Scottish voter over the same period in which their being phased out by the Conservative government moved the policy output of the UK government further away from them. The development of a political dimension of the EU that was largely absent in 1979 likely contributed to the EU being seen as a wider political framework for Scotland alternative of, and more desirable than, the UK, which profoundly altered the perception of independence. In sum, supporters of self-government - who shared left-of-centre political opinions - came to adopt a positive view of the European Union because they endorsed the free-trade model of integration and because over the same period the EU developed a social dimension of integration that was very close to their preferences. As a result, the European Union came to be perceived as more attractive than the British Union by a significant section of supporters of self-government.

³⁸ Scots voted proportionally more against the EU in the referendum of 1975 than the other areas of the UK and Nationalists were those mostly against, see Kirby and Taylor (1976: especially 190)

Support for the EU and demand for self-government

Turning to the analysis of the association between support for the European Union and the demand for self-government I found a radically different pattern between 1979 and 1997 [table 19]. In 1979 support for the European Union was in negative correlation with demand for self-government, both at the virtual and at the actual level. This means that those who were demanding self-government for Scotland had a negative perception of the European Union, more particularly of its economic impact on Scotland. In contrast, in 1997 both support for membership of the EU and for the signing up to the Social Charter were positively correlated with virtual and actual demand for self-government. The correlation was especially strong with support for the Social Charter. On the other hand, identification with the EU was not significantly associated with the demand for self-government, either substantially or statistically. The results for 1997 therefore indicate that those who were in favour of Scottish self-government at the time of the second referendum had a positive perception of the European Union, in particular of the economic and social effects of its policies on Scotland. Once again, the affective dimension of support for the EU had no influence on the demand for self-government.

Attitudes to membership of the European Union were also significantly associated with expectations about the Scottish parliament on the part of those who voted Yes in the referendum and with their priorities about the parliament's work [table 20]. From this crosstabulation two important elements emerge. First, there was a wide gap in the relative importance of the item 'stronger voice in the EU' depending on whether the question was about expectations or priorities. On the one hand, there was a large consensus that a Scottish parliament would make Scotland's voice in the EU stronger; on the other hand the item did not figure among the top priorities. However, whether the respondent had a positive or negative attitude towards the effect of EU membership on Scotland had a significant impact on the distribution of expectations and priorities. Those satisfied with EU membership were more likely to expect a stronger EU voice for Scotland as a result of devolution but the issue was not a high priority for them. On the contrary, those with a negative opinion of EU membership were more pessimistic about the ability of the Scottish parliament to make Scotland's voice in the EU stronger but the issue was much more important for them. Significantly, for respondents belonging to the latter group 'increasing the standard of living' was the top priority (twice as likely so than for those satisfied with membership). Three elements seem to emerge from these set of results. First, those who had a negative

³⁹ On the left's conversion to European integration, see Hix (1999b); on the hegemony of the left in

perception of the economic effects of membership of the EU on Scotland seemed to attribute this negative effect to a substantial extent to an inadequate 'voice' at the EU level, i.e. to an unsatisfactory representation of Scotland's interests. Second, they wanted the Scottish parliament to fulfil that role but seemed to think that a satisfactory representation of Scotland's interests at the EU level would not come about as a natural consequence of devolution but would require an 'activist' policy on the part of the proposed Scottish executive. Third, the gap between expectations and priority may also indicate that those dissatisfied with EU membership thought a devolved Scottish parliament would be unable to provide an effective representation of Scottish interests at the EU level and the latter could only be provided by an independent parliament with member states status. In sum, the perception of the European Union among supporters of self-government in Scotland radically changed from negative to positive between 1979 and 1997. Also, the representation of Scotland's interests at the EU level became an important issue in the demand for self-government in the 1990s.

How changed perception of the EU raised the demand for self-government

As the data presented above show, virtual supporters of devolution had a much less negative attitude to independence in 1997 than in 1979. I would contend that the changed perception of the European Union rather than internal UK developments is the main factor accounting for this difference. This contention is based on three main points. First, the European Union was the most important feature of the international environment for a prospective independent Scotland. Evidence that the EU was such is given, among other things, by the fact that European questions were the only international questions presented as internal political issues in the electoral study surveys from which data for this paper are drawn. Second, the dramatic rise in the support for independence was almost entirely due to the inclusion of the option of 'independence in Europe' following the change of policy on the part of the SNP. This means that in essence independence enjoyed higher support because it was explicitly placed in the context of the EU. It was the attitude to the context then that made the option more popular rather than the attitude to the option itself. Finally, the determining role of support for the EU on the demand for self-government is the one that underwent the most radical change between 1979 and 1997. Satisfaction with EU membership went from having a significant negative influence to having a significant positive influence on the demand for self-government both at the virtual and, especially, at the actual levels. Furthermore, support for the social dimension of the EU, which was very strongly

Scotland, see Tiryakian (1981: 41)

associated with the demand for self-government was also in a strong negative association with all the measures of support for the UK. Besides its impact on the perception of independence, European integration appears to have had a significant direct impact on the demand for devolution by raising the importance of the representation of Scottish interests at the EU level as shown by the data on the policy priorities for the proposed parliament.

As mentioned above, the perception of the EU on the part of supporters of self-government influenced the strength of their demand primarily through its impact on the attitudes to independence. The main reason why independence was strongly opposed in 1979 was that the external environment, i.e. the environment in which an independent Scotland would have had to live without the 'protection' of the United Kingdom framework was perceived negatively. In particular, the main element of that environment, the European Union was perceived negatively, as shown by the lack of support for membership. As a result, first, the independence option was supported by only 7 per cent of the population (including only 37 per cent of Nationalist identifiers) and, secondly, it was perceived as involving lower utility than the status quo. By virtue of the interaction effect between attitudes to independence and attitudes to devolution, the negative perception of the EU indirectly contributed to lowering the utility of devolution thus reducing the actual demand for self-government relative to its virtual level. In particular, the negative perception of the EU among Labour identifiers likely compounded their negative perception of independence based on the fact that the latter would have deprived Scotland of the benefits of the centralised management of the economy at the UK level⁴⁰ while the weakly positive perception of Conservative identifiers was not enough to compensate for their perceived very high costs of independence in economic, political and symbolic terms. The SNP's opposition to the EU removed any role the latter might have had in providing an external environment facilitating secession from the UK. Indeed, in the eyes of Conservative identifiers, the SNP's opposition to the EU probably made their opposition to secession stronger as independence would have resulted in cutting Scotland off both the English and the European markets. As discussed in section 2 above, the gap between virtual and actual support concerned almost exclusively Conservative and Labour identifiers. In the light of what precedes, therefore, European factors had a negative impact on the demand for self-government in 1979.

The situation was reversed in 1997. The positive perception of both the economic and the social aspects of the EU together with the importance acquired by Scotland's voice in the EU were the crucial factors making attitudes to independence much less negative. In particular,

membership of a single-market EU was perceived as lowering the economic costs of independence by guaranteeing market access and broad regulatory stability while the availability of a wide range of political and institutional benefits at the EU level lowered the political costs of secession from the UK. The transfer of powers to Brussels and the dominant role of the Council of Ministers and, to a lesser extent of the Parliament increased the benefits of the 'member state' status vis-à-vis the 'region' status. Last but by no means least, the casting of independence within the EU framework reduced the symbolic costs of secession by removing many of the negative symbolic connotations of secession such as isolation and separatism. These three elements were bound together and reinforced by the SNP's policy of 'Independence in Europe'⁴¹. By placing independence in the context of the EU, the SNP succeeded in deeply transforming the perception of independence and, by implication, of itself. Both independence and the SNP came to be accepted as mainstream policy and party, respectively. In terms of costs/benefits analysis, therefore, the costs of independence were likely to be perceived as much lower in 1997 than in 1979 and this 'cost reduction' was almost entirely due to its now being placed in the context of a more integrated EU. As a result, the independence option was supported by 35 per cent of the population (including 36 per cent of Labour identifiers and 72 per cent of Nationalist identifiers) and, crucially, was perceived as less costly than the status quo. The much higher importance of the question of Scotland's voice in Europe also directly raised the perceived benefits of self-government in the devolution form on the assumption that a Scottish parliament would make the representation of Scottish interests in the EU more effective and more accountable. As more and more decisions affecting Scotland were taken in Brussels, the process of integration added a European dimension to the 'democratic deficit' at the UK level created by the shrinking support for the Conservative party in Scotland. As a consequence, the demand for self-government to eliminate the 'democratic deficit' at the UK level was increased by the emergence of a EU dimension in which Scotland was perceived as not being satisfactorily represented either from an effectiveness or from an accountability point of view⁴².

The positive perception of the economic and political aspects of the EU, by dramatically lowering the perceived costs of independence, largely removed the negative impact of the interaction effect thus reducing the gap between virtual and actual demand for self-government to minimal levels. It is important to point out that European integration changed public attitudes to independence primarily through the advocacy on the part of the SNP of the policy of 'independence in Europe' and through the competitive reaction of the Labour

⁴⁰ On the role of this issue in shaping the Labour party policy on devolution, see Keating and Bleiman (1979)

⁴¹ On the 'Independence in Europe' policy, see Macartney (1990)

⁴² On the 'democratic deficit' in Scotland see Miller (1981: 205-7), Punnett (1984: 156-8), McCreadie (1991: 47), Mitchell (1996: 30-9).

party. In this respect, thus the external factor influenced public opinion through the medium of party policies. In other words, what turned the benefits/costs balance in favour of secession relative to the status in 1979 was that independence was placed firmly in the context of the European Union and that the latter was now perceived as offering a favourable external environment by those demanding self-government. Through this causal mechanism and through the direct one mentioned above, European factors raised the demand for self-government at both the virtual and, most notably, the actual levels. The present analysis, by incorporating a crucial external factor, can thus provide a robust explanation to the puzzle of why a Scottish assembly/parliament was rejected in 1979 and approved in 1997 while self-government consistently enjoyed above two-thirds support throughout the period 1979-1997⁴³.

Conclusion

The process of European integration and its use by political parties and interest groups had a very substantial impact on the demand for self-government in Scotland between 1979 and 1997 and it was a crucial factor in accounting for the approval of self-government in 1997 as opposed to its rejection in 1979. It did so as a result of three conditions.

The first condition was that in Scotland the demand for devolution was heavily influenced by attitudes to independence as the probability that the former would be a stepping stone to the latter was perceived as being very high. This created an interaction effect between independence and devolution and caused a large gap between support for self-government at the attitudinal and at the behavioural levels in 1979. Through the independence/devolution interaction effect, variables related to the international environment indirectly impacted on the demand for devolution, in particular as expressed by vote in the referendums. As a result European factors influenced the demand for self-government.

The second condition was that the process of European integration evolved very substantially between 1979 and 1997 in at least three respects. First, economic integration was dramatically deepened by the single market programme and by the preparation for EMU. Second, the EU acquired decision-making responsibilities over a wide range of policy areas previously dealt with exclusively at the state level. Third, the EU also developed policies of 'positive' integration, notably the social and cohesion policies. In sum, the European Union underwent a process of integration which conferred to the EU the characteristics of a political system rather than those of a mere economic environment⁴⁴.

⁴³ On the long-term support for self-government, see for example Mitchell et al. (1998: 166).

⁴⁴ On the conception of the EU as a political system see Hix (1999a).

The third condition was that this process of integration at the EU level, in particular its economic aspects, came to be perceived in positive terms by those demanding self-government and by a significant percentage of them as an opportunity for Scotland rather than a threat. On the basis of this positive perception European integration started to be considered as a factor lowering the costs of self-government, directly in the case of the independence option and indirectly in the case of devolution, thus raising support for them. These findings provide empirical support for the hypothesis that the UK's entry into the EU and the development of integration would have had a positive effect on the demand for self-government in Scotland⁴⁵. By extension, they also demonstrate that European integration affects the demand for self-government at regional level in the member states and, under certain conditions, may increase it. This paper argues that it did so in the Scottish case. They thus provide an ex-post confutation of the conclusion the Royal Commission of the Constitution reached in 1973, which reads: "while the United Kingdom's entry into Europe does not rule out the separation of Scotland and Wales, it does not make it any more attractive"⁴⁶.

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⁴⁵ See Bogdanor (1979a: especially 99-100), Urwin (1982: 67) and Kellas (1991: 226-31).

⁴⁶ Cfr. Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution (1973: 150)

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Tables

Table 1 - Virtual demand for self-government by party identification (column %)

| 1979: Here are a number of suggestions ⁴⁷ which have been made about different ways of governing Scotland. Can you tell me which one comes closest to your own view? 1997: Which of these statements ⁴⁸ come closest to your view...Scotland should...? | | | | | | | | |
|--|--------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| | Conservative | | Labour | | Nationalist | | All | |
| | 1979 | 1997 | 1979 | 1997 | 1979 | 1997 | 1979 | 1997 |
| Status quo | 40 | 61 | 20 | 7 | 5 | 2 | 26 | 19 |
| Assembly | 29 | - | 31 | - | 9 | - | 28 | - |
| Parliament | 17 | - | 31 | - | 36 | - | 26 | - |
| Devolution | 46 | 28 | 62 | 53 | 45 | 25 | 54 | 43 |
| Indep. In EU | - | 8 | - | 26 | - | 54 | - | 26 |
| Indep. Out EU | (3) | 1 | (4) | 10 | (37) | 18 | (7) | 9 |
| Independence | 3 | 9 | 4 | 36 | 37 | 72 | 7 | 35 |
| Self-government | 49 | 37 | 66 | 89 | 82 | 89 | 61 | 78 |
| Don't know | 11 | 2 | 14 | 4 | 13 | 9 | 13 | 3 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 197 | 123 | 235 | 336 | 66 | 122 | 729 | 676 |

Sources: Scottish Election Study 1979, Scottish Referendum Study 1997

Table 2 - Perception of party position on self-government (column %)

| 1979: Which statement do you think comes closest to the view of the...party? 1997: Which of these statements, do you think, comes closest to the view of the ...party? | | | | | | |
|---|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| | 1979 | | | 1997 | | |
| | Con | Lab | SNP | Con | Lab | SNP |
| Status quo | 59 | 22 | 2 | 67 | 10 | 2 |
| Assembly | 25 | 51 | 1 | - | - | - |
| Parliament | 4 | 13 | 6 | - | - | - |
| Devolution | 29 | 64 | 7 | 16 | 66 | 9 |
| Independence in EU | - | - | - | 3 | 7 | 44 |
| Independence out EU | - | - | - | 1 | 2 | 33 |
| Independence | 0 | 2 | 86 | 4 | 9 | 77 |
| Self-government | 29 | 66 | 93 | 20 | 75 | 86 |
| Don't know | 12 | 12 | 5 | 13 | 15 | 12 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 652 | 653 | 653 | 882 | 882 | 882 |

Sources: Scottish Election Studies 1979 and 1997

⁴⁷ No devolution or Scottish assembly of any sort; Have Scottish Committees of the House of Commons come up to Scotland for their meetings; An elected Scottish assembly which would handle some Scottish affairs and would be responsible to Parliament at Westminster; A Scottish Parliament which would handle most Scottish affairs, including many economic affairs, leaving the Westminster Parliament responsible only for defence, foreign policy and international economic policy; A completely independent Scotland with a Scottish Parliament. I collapsed the first two categories under the category 'status quo' as there is a wide consensus in referring to devolution as to the establishment of an elected body.

⁴⁸ Scotland should remain part of the UK without an elected parliament; Scotland should remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament which has no taxation powers; Scotland should remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament which has some taxation powers; Scotland should become

Table 3 - Actual demand for self-government by party identification (column %)

| 1979: Did you vote in the recent referendum on Devolution for Scotland? If Yes did you vote 'Yes' or 'No' If no did you favour the 'Yes' side or the 'No' side? 1997: How did you vote on the first question ⁴⁹ ? | | | | | | | | |
|---|--------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| | Conservative | | Labour | | Nationalist | | All | |
| | 1979 | 1997 | 1979 | 1997 | 1979 | 1997 | 1979 | 1997 |
| (Total No) | (75) | - | (41) | - | (7) | - | (45) | - |
| Voted No | 62 | 58 | 27 | 7 | 3 | 1 | 33 | 18 |
| Favoured No | 13 | - | 14 | - | 4 | - | 12 | - |
| No preference | 5 | 27 | 8 | 27 | 4 | 21 | 16 | 27 |
| Favoured Yes | 4 | - | 8 | - | 12 | - | 6 | - |
| Voted Yes | 16 | 15 | 43 | 66 | 77 | 78 | 33 | 55 |
| (Total Yes) | (20) | - | (51) | - | (89) | - | (39) | - |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 201 | 123 | 246 | 336 | 68 | 147 | 729 | 882 |

Sources: Scottish Election Study 1979, Scottish Referendum Study 1997

Table 4 - Interpretation of the referendum result by party identification (column %) 1979

| In your own opinion, did the referendum result show that the Scottish people wanted an Assembly or not? | | | | |
|---|--------------|-----------|-------------|------------|
| Weight/Category | Conservative | Labour | Nationalist | All |
| -1 Did not want assembly | 66 | 42 | 16 | 47 |
| 0 Indecisive result | 16 | 15 | 21 | 16 |
| 1 Wanted assembly | 17 | 40 | 62 | 33 |
| Don't know | 1 | 3 | 1 | 4 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Index* | -49 | -2 | 46 | -14 |

Note: N=658; *equal to the sum of the weights given to each category multiplied by the column percentages. Source: Scottish Election Study 1979

Table 5 - Index* of importance of self-government

| 1979: When you were deciding about voting, how important was the general issue of the form of government for Scotland? 1997: When you were deciding about voting in the general election, how important was this issue - Scottish Parliament - to you? Was it... | | | |
|---|------------|------------|--------------|
| | 1979 | 1997 | 79/97 Change |
| Conservative identifiers | 163 | 138 | -25 |
| Labour identifiers | 172 | 164 | -8 |
| Nationalist identifiers | 249 | 217 | -32 |
| Full sample | 178 | 161 | -17 |
| Correlation with demand (gamma) | .40*** | .38*** | |
| N | 729 | 882 | |

Note: *index varies between 100=100% of respondents thought self-government was not very important and 300=100% of respondents thought self-government was extremely important; ***p<.001. Sources: Scottish General Election Studies 1979 and 1997

independent, separate from the UK but part of the European Union; Scotland should become independent, separate from the UK and the European Union.

⁴⁹ Should there be a Scottish parliament in the UK?

Table 6 - Virtual/actual support for self-government gap by party identification (%)

| | Conservative | | Labour | | Nationalist | | All | |
|--------------------|--------------|-----|--------|-----|-------------|-----|-----|-----|
| | 79 | 97 | 79 | 97 | 79 | 97 | 79 | 97 |
| Status quo | +22 | -3 | +7 | 0 | -2 | -1 | +7 | -1 |
| (Status quo)* | (+35) | - | +21 | - | (+2) | - | +19 | - |
| Self-government | -33 | -22 | -23 | -23 | -5 | -11 | -28 | -23 |
| (Self-government)* | (-29) | - | -15 | - | (+7) | - | -22 | |

Note: including preferences of those who did not vote, see table 3. Sources: Scottish Election Study 1979 and Scottish Referendum Study 1997

Table 7 - Referendum vote of virtual supporters of self-government (column %)

| 1979: Did you vote in the recent referendum on Devolution for Scotland? If Yes did you vote 'Yes' or 'No' If no did you favour the 'Yes' side or the 'No' side? 1997: How did you vote on the first question ⁵⁰ ? | | | | | | |
|---|--------------|-----------|------------|-----------|-----------------|-----------|
| | Independence | | Devolution | | Self-government | |
| | 1979 | 1997 | 1979 | 1997 | 1979 | 1997 |
| (Total Yes) | (80) | (75) | (51) | (65) | (57) | (70) |
| Voted Yes | 68 | 75 | 46 | 65 | 49 | 70 |
| <i>Didn't vote favoured Yes</i> | 12 | - | 8 | - | 8 | - |
| <i>Didn't vote no preference</i> | 8 | 23 | 7 | 28 | 7 | 25 |
| <i>Didn't vote favoured No</i> | 2 | - | 11 | - | 10 | - |
| Voted No | 10 | 2 | 28 | 7 | 26 | 5 |
| (Total No) | (12) | (2) | (39) | (7) | (36) | (5) |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 50 | 232 | 394 | 289 | 444 | 521 |

Sources: Scottish Election Study 1979, Scottish Referendum Study 1997

Table 8 - Referendum vote of virtual supporters of devolution by option preference (column %) 1979

| 1979: Did you vote in the recent referendum on Devolution for Scotland? If Yes did you vote 'Yes' or 'No' If no did you favour the 'Yes' side or the 'No' side? 1997: How did you vote on the first question ⁵¹ ? | | | |
|---|-----------|------------|------------|
| | Assembly | Parliament | Devolution |
| (Total Yes) | (42) | (67) | (51) |
| Voted Yes | 36 | 57 | 46 |
| <i>Didn't vote favoured Yes</i> | 6 | 10 | 8 |
| <i>Didn't vote no preference</i> | 5 | 8 | 7 |
| <i>Didn't vote favoured No</i> | 14 | 9 | 11 |
| Voted No | 39 | 16 | 28 |
| (Total No) | (53) | (25) | (39) |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 205 | 189 | 394 |

Sources: Scottish Election Study 1979

⁵⁰ Should there be a Scottish parliament in the UK?

⁵¹ Should there be a Scottish parliament in the UK?

**Table 9 - Most important disadvantage of devolution by constitutional preference (column %)
1979**

| Which one of these is the most important disadvantage of devolution? | | | | | |
|--|------------|----------|------------|--------------|-----|
| | Status quo | Assembly | Parliament | Independence | All |
| Break up UK | 38 | 37 | 23 | 16 | 27 |
| Cost of bureaucracy | 25 | 22 | 25 | 28 | 22 |
| Too many levels of govt | 16 | 18 | 16 | 16 | 15 |
| Benefits wrong | 5 | 10 | 11 | 8 | 8 |
| Harm economy | 9 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 5 |
| Loss UK voice | 4 | 6 | 6 | 10 | 5 |
| Others/don't know | 3 | 1 | 15 | 20 | 18 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

Note: N=729. Source: Scottish Election Study 1979

**Table 10 - Most important disadvantage of devolution by vote in the referendum (column %)
1979**

| Which one of these is the most important disadvantage of devolution? | | | | |
|--|------------------|------------|------------------|------------|
| | Yes | | No | |
| | Self-government* | Assembly** | Self-government* | Assembly** |
| Break up UK | 22 | 26 | 37 | 44 |
| Cost of bureaucracy | 27 | 28 | 26 | 19 |
| Too many levels of govt | 16 | 18 | 19 | 19 |
| Benefits wrong | 11 | 10 | 8 | 8 |
| Harm economy | 4 | 8 | 1 | 1 |
| Loss UK voice | 9 | 9 | 4 | 4 |
| Others/don't know | 11 | 1 | 5 | 5 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 444 | 205 | 444 | 205 |

Note: *sub-sample of 'virtual' supporters of the three self-government options: assembly, parliament, independence; **sub-sample of supporters of the assembly option only. Source: Scottish Election Study 1979

**Table 11 - Parliament's most important thing not to do by vote in the referendum (column %)
1997**

| This card shows a few things a Scottish parliament might want to bring about...And which, if any, should a Scottish parliament <u>not</u> try to bring about? IF SEVERAL MENTIONED: Which is the most important? | | | |
|--|-----|-----|-----|
| | Yes | No | All |
| Leave UK more likely | 47 | 85 | 56 |
| Stronger voice in UK | 3 | 1 | 2 |
| Stronger voice in EU | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| More pride in country | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Increase standard of living | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| None of these | 32 | 5 | 25 |
| Others/Don't know | 15 | 6 | 14 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 |

Note: N=676. Source: Scottish Referendum Study 1997

Table 12 - Attitudes* of supporters of devolution to the status quo and to independence 1979

For each suggestion⁵² on the card, could you say whether you are very much in favour, somewhat in favour, somewhat against or very much against that suggestion?

| | Status quo 1** | Status quo 2** | Independence |
|------------|----------------|----------------|--------------|
| Assembly | -91 | 17 | -163 |
| Parliament | -110 | -30 | -87 |
| Devolution | -100 | -3 | -126 |

Note: N=394; *numbers refer to indices of support which vary from -200 to +200, see Appendix, table XX; **there were two options which largely amounted to maintaining the status quo in the 1979 survey, see note 3. Source: Scottish Election Study 1979

Table 13 - Perceived effect of SNP on devolution by party identification (column %) 1979

Whether or not you yourself ever voted for the SNP, what effect do you think the SNP has had on devolution?

| Weight/Category | Conservative | Labour | Nationalist | All |
|--|--------------|------------|-------------|------------|
| -1 Delayed devolution by frightening off those who feared separation | 49 | 42 | 35 | 42 |
| 0 Not much effect | 26 | 32 | 17 | 27 |
| 1 Speeded up moves towards devolution | 21 | 22 | 44 | 26 |
| 0 Don't know | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Index* | -28 | -20 | 9 | -16 |

Note: N=729; *equal to the sum of the weights given to each category multiplied by the column percentages. Source: Scottish Election Study 1979

Table 14 - Second preference of supporters of devolution by party identification (%) 1997

Which of these statements comes closest to your view...And which would be your second preference?

| | Conservative | Labour | Nationalist | All |
|--------------------------|--------------|--------|-------------|-----|
| Status quo | 26 | 16 | 3 | 17 |
| Independence | 15 | 30 | 37 | 30 |
| Other devolution option* | 47 | 34 | 43 | 34 |
| Don't know | 12 | 20 | 17 | 19 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| N | 34 | 178 | 30 | 289 |

Note: *with tax-raising powers or vice-versa. Source: Scottish Referendum Study 1997.

Table 15 - Indices of support for the UK

| | 1979 | 1997 |
|---|------------|-------------|
| Satisfaction with government* | 15 | -0.5 |
| Sat. with govt - Con ID | 48 | 19 |
| Sat. with govt - Lab ID | 15.5 | -3 |
| Sat. with govt - Nat ID | -24.5 | -13.5 |
| Perception of Scotland's welfare** | -74 | -29 |
| Perc. Scot. Welfare - Con ID | -62 | 4 |
| Perc. Scot. Welfare - Lab ID | -77 | -37 |
| Perc. Scot. Welfare - Nat ID | -85 | -37 |
| Identification with the UK*** | -16 | -30 |
| Ident. UK - Con ID | 4 | 27 |
| Ident. UK - Lab ID | -25 | -40 |
| Ident. UK - Nat ID | -69 | -75 |

⁵² See list at note 3

Note: *index varies between -100=complete dissatisfaction and +100=complete satisfaction, 1997 data are relative to General Election; **index varies between -100=100% of respondents thought Scotland was worse off than the rest of the UK and +100=100% of respondents thought Scotland was better off, 1997 data relative to Referendum; ***index varies between -100=exclusive identification with Scotland and +100=exclusive identification with the UK, 1997 data relative to Referendum. Sources: Scottish General Election Studies 1979, 1997 and Scottish Referendum Study 1997

Table 16 – Correlation between support for the UK and demand for self-government (gamma values)

| | 1979 | 1997 |
|----------------------------------|---------|------------|
| Virtual demand | | |
| Satisfaction with UK government | -.39*** | -.21***(R) |
| Satisfaction with UK democracy | - | -.30***(E) |
| Perception of Scotland's welfare | -.25*** | -.23***(R) |
| Identification with the UK | -.40*** | -.51***(R) |
| Actual demand | | |
| Satisfaction with UK government | -.43*** | -.29*** |
| Perception of Scotland's welfare | -.25** | -.48*** |
| Identification with the UK | -.47*** | -.64*** |

Note: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05; (E)=data relative to General Election, (R)=data relative to Referendum. Sources: Scottish Election Studies 1979, 1997 and Scottish Referendum Study 1997

Table 17 - Indices of support for the EU

| | 1979 | 1997 |
|---|------------|------------|
| Satisfaction with membership* | -10 | 32 |
| Sat. with mem - Con ID | 16 | 30 |
| Sat. with mem - Lab ID | -23 | 30 |
| Sat. with mem - Nat ID | -48 | 35 |
| Support for the Social Charter** | - | 19 |
| Supp. Soc. Chap. - Con ID | - | -39 |
| Supp. Soc. Chap. - Lab ID | - | 34 |
| Supp. Soc. Chap. - Nat ID | - | 30 |
| Identification with Europe*** | - | -76 |
| Ident. EU - Con ID | - | -70 |
| Ident. EU - Lab ID | - | -82 |
| Ident. EU - Nat ID | - | -76 |

Note: *index varies between -100=100% of respondents thought membership of the EU was bad for Scotland and +100=100% of respondents thought membership of the EU was good for Scotland, 1997 data are relative to Referendum; **index varies between -100=100% of respondents thought the UK should not sign up to the Social Charter and +100=100% of respondents thought the UK should sign up to the Social Charter, 1997 data relative to General Election; ***index varies between -100=0% of respondents thought of themselves as Europeans and +100=100% of respondents thought of themselves as Europeans, 1997 data relative to Referendum. Sources: Scottish General Election Studies 1979, 1997 and Scottish Referendum Study 1997

Table 18 – Correlations between support for the EU and support for the UK (gamma values)

| | 1979 | 97:membership | 97: social charter | 97: identification |
|----------------------------------|--------|---------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Satisfaction with UK government | .49*** | .36***(R) | -.37***(E) | -.17 (R) |
| Satisfaction with UK democracy | - | .22** (E) | -.30*** (E) | -.08 (E) |
| Scotland's welfare vs rest of UK | .15 | .09 (R) | - | .11 (R) |
| UK economic benefits | - | .36*** (R) | -.20* (E) | .09 (R) |
| Identification with the UK | .22** | .10 (R) | -.12 (E) | .06 (R) |

Note: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05. Sources: Scottish Election Studies 1979, 1997 and Scottish Referendum Study 1997

Table 19 – Correlations between support for the EU and demand for self-government (gamma values)

| | 1979 | 97:membership | 97: social charter | 97: identification |
|--------------------------------------|---------|---------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Virtual (inclusive of out EU option) | - | .05 | .37*** | .04 |
| Virtual (exclusive of out EU option) | -.21** | .26** | .48*** | .13 |
| Actual | -.24*** | .33* | .68*** | -.02 |

Note: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05. Sources: Scottish Election Studies 1979, 1997 and Scottish Referendum Study 1997

Table 20 – Expectations and Priorities of actual supporters of self-government by satisfaction with EU membership 1997

| Expectations: Will a Scottish Parliament...? Priorities: Scottish Parliament first thing to do? | | | | | | |
|--|---------------|------------|------------|--------------|------------|------------|
| | Expectations* | | | Priorities** | | |
| | <i>Good</i> | <i>Bad</i> | <i>All</i> | <i>Good</i> | <i>Bad</i> | <i>All</i> |
| More say in government | 88 | 84 | 87 | 34 | 22 | 32 |
| Increase standard of living | 70 | 73 | 70 | 18 | 36 | 22 |
| Improve education | 93 | 89 | 92 | 23 | 18 | 22 |
| Stronger voice in UK | 82 | 85 | 83 | 13 | 4 | 11 |
| Stronger voice in EU | 85 | 76 | 83 | 4 | 16 | 6 |
| More likely leave UK | -1 | 20 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 |
| More pride in country | 82 | 84 | 83 | 4 | 0 | 3 |
| Total | - | - | - | 99 | 100 | 100 |

Note: N=236, *numbers refer to indices of agreement where -100=100% of respondents saying that the Scottish Parliament will not bring about each of the listed effects and +100=100% of respondents saying that the Scottish Parliament will bring about each of the listed effects; **numbers are column percentages. Source: Scottish Referendum Study 1997