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Democratic Deficit or Europeanisation of Secession?
Explaining the Variation in the Demand for Self-Government in
Scotland, 1979 and 1997

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Abstract

The paper deals with the variation in the demand for self-government in Scotland between the 1970s and the 1990s and, in particular, between the referendums of 1979 when devolution failed and that of 1997 when devolution was endorsed. The existing literature mainly deals with each of the two referendums in isolation and does not provide an explicitly comparative analysis between them. However, analyses of the 1997 referendum tend to identify as main cause of the variation the 'democratic deficit' created by Conservative rule between 1979 and 1997 which only enjoyed minority support in Scotland. The proposed paper is drawn from a wider research project that takes issue with both these aspects. Firstly, it offers an explicitly comparative analysis over time of the public demand for self-government at the time of the two referendums as well as of the strategies of parties and interest groups in the periods leading to them. Secondly, it proposes an explanation for the variation that challenges the current emphasis on the 'democratic deficit'. The explanation is based on a rational-institutionalist theoretical framework and on empirical evidence mainly provided by the Election and Referendum Studies for 1979 and 1997. The paper identifies three key elements in the dynamics of the demand for self-government between the two points in time – the interaction effect between devolution and independence, the role of the European context in shaping perceptions of independence and the gap between support for self-government and the actual vote in the referendum – and argues that it was sharp change within these three variables rather than the 'democratic deficit' *per se* that provides a robust explanation for the different results of the two referendums. More specifically, the paper argues that this change can be seen as a process of Europeanisation that raised the demand for self-government in Scotland by improving the costs/benefits balance of self-government relative to the status quo.

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I Introduction

Scottish devolution is the most far-reaching change in the British constitution since the secession of Ireland in the 1920s. It is also the most prominent recent case of successful demand for regional self-government in Europe¹. The demand for Scottish self-government that led to the establishment of a parliament presents a puzzle for political science analysis. On the one hand, public opinion – as measured by opinion polls – displays an extraordinary degree of stability and consistency with support for home rule consistently around two-thirds throughout the post-war period. On the other hand, the two defining moments of this demand – the 1979 and 1997 referendums – produced starkly different results: in 1979 devolution was rejected while in 1997 it was enthusiastically endorsed. Explanations of the demand for self-government in Scotland thus face a twofold task. First, to explain why devolution was rejected in the 1979 referendum while support for various forms of self-government has never been below 60 per cent throughout the post-war period. Second, to explain why devolved self-government was endorsed in 1997 after having been rejected in 1979. Existing studies of Scottish devolution deal with each of the two referendums in isolation and as yet there is no explicitly comparative work addressing the puzzle outlined above. This paper aims to contribute to the existing literature by proposing a theoretical model developed from a comparative analysis of the results of two referendums and thus able to provide a more robust explanation than those currently advanced. I contrast the latter, based on domestic factors and, especially, on the 1979-'97 'democratic deficit', to the model advanced in these pages centred on the impact of the European dimension and in particular on the 'Europeanisation of secession'. The paper argues that such Europeanisation model is able to offer a theoretically coherent and empirically substantiated explanation of the puzzle. The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Part II briefly reviews and critiques the existing studies of Scottish devolution. Part III presents the theoretical framework of the Europeanisation model and the empirical evidence supporting it. The final part concludes.

II A critique of the existing explanations

No cross-time comparative study of the results of the two referendums has so far been carried out but there is a number of studies dealing with each of the two referendums. Three main explanations have been advanced for the variation in the demand for self-government between 1979 and 1997. I group them here under the label 'domestic factors' as they focus on the dynamics internal to the UK in contrast to the incorporation of the European dimension in the model proposed below. Those dealing with the 1979 referendum address the puzzle of why devolution was rejected even if home rule enjoyed majority support but do

not attempt to explicitly account for it. The first explanation focuses on the difference between the Scotland Act 1978 and the devolution proposals presented by the Constitutional Convention and endorsed by the Labour party in 1992-1997. The former was perceived as being overwhelmingly a partisan document which intended to entrench Labour domination in Scotland through an assembly elected by the first-past-the-post system. In contrast, the devolution proposals of the 1990s were perceived to be the product of a wide consensus within Scottish society, symbolised by the agreement on a proportional electoral system. The close identification of devolution with the Labour party determined that in 1979 non-Labour pro-devolutionists turned against the Scotland Act. On this basis, they explain the collapse of support among Conservative identifiers in the run-up to the referendum whereas in 1997 devolution attracted wide support².

The second explanation focuses on the popularity of the Labour party and the effectiveness of the pro-devolution referendum campaign. Proponents of this explanation point out that the Labour party was deeply unpopular in 1979 and that the Yes front ran a divided and underfunded campaign relative to their opponents³. In contrast the Labour party was at the peak of their popularity in September 1997, that the Yes campaign was conducted jointly by Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the SNP and that it enjoyed higher financial resources than the No side⁴. These differences determined that in 1979 Labour's unpopularity and the ineffective campaign undermined support for devolution while in 1997 the situation was reversed. The last, but currently the most influential, explanation explains the different results of the two referendums as a product of the so-called 'democratic deficit' created by eighteen years of Conservative rule at the UK level which was consistently rejected in Scotland. According to this theory demand for self-government was 'soft' in the 1970s and was thus easily undermined by the Conservative policy of supporting devolution in principle but opposing the Scotland Act 1978⁵. In contrast, the 1979-1997 'democratic deficit' had transformed home rule into the 'settled will of the Scottish people' which was reflected in a very stable public support for devolution⁶. Different authors account for this either as a

¹ By 'regional' I mean sub-state with no implications on the national status of Scotland.

² See Balsom and McAllister (1979: 402-5) for 1979 and Mitchell et al. (1998: 168), Pattie et al. (1998: 8) for 1997.

³ Watt (1979: 146), Bochel and Denver (1981: 144), Butler and McLean (1999: 7), Kellas (1999: 225) emphasise the unpopularity of the Labour party; Perman (1979: 54), Mitchell (1996a: 163-4), Mitchell et al. (1998: 167) and Denver et al. (2000: 19) stress the divisions and the contradictions within the Yes front.

⁴ See Jones (1997: 3-4), Mitchell et al. (1998: 168), Pattie et al. (1998: 14-5), Pattie et al. (1999: 141-2), Denver et al. (2000: 49, 75-6).

⁵ See Bochel and Denver (1981: 144), Brand (1986: 38),

⁶ See Mitchell et al. (1998: 178), Pattie et al. (1998: 14; 1999: 140), Denver et al. (2000: 169), Brown et al. (1998: 62), Taylor et al. (1999: xxxix-xi); SurrIDGE and McCrone (1999: 440), Paterson and Wyn Jones (1999: 179-80), Kellas (1999: 223).

convergence of the 'class' and 'identity' cleavages or as the 'mobilisation of the middle classes'⁷.

While most of these explanations certainly point to important factors in the dynamic of the demand for devolution in Scotland between 1979 and 1997, they do not provide – either individually or collectively – a satisfactory general explanation of the different results of the two referendums. There are two reasons for this failure. At the empirical level, many of their assertions fail to be supported by the results of data analysis. At the theoretical level, their implied model fails to conceptualise crucial aspects of the demand for self-government. I discuss the empirical evidence first.

The claim that the Scotland Act 1978 was rejected because non-Labour identifiers perceived it as Labour-biased is not confirmed by the pattern of referendum voting by party identification. Though Conservative identifiers proportionally voted No more than Labour identifiers this was not the case among the two other party identifications. Liberal identifiers displayed a voting pattern very similar to that of Labour identifiers while Nationalist identifiers voted overwhelmingly Yes⁸. Nor is it consistent with the fact that a very substantial proportion of Labour identifiers themselves – 36 per cent including those who did not vote but had a preference – also voted No. Moreover, the voting patterns by party identification were very similar in the two referendums, with the notable exception of Labour identifiers, a higher proportion of whom voted Yes in 1997. These voting patterns are inconsistent with the claim that the Scotland Act 1978 was rejected because perceived as Labour-biased while the White Paper 1997 was not. Likewise, the hypothesis that devolution was rejected because it was associated with an unpopular government does not find support in the data. The fundamental problem here is that the claim of Labour's unpopularity derives from UK-wide opinion surveys rather than data relative to Scottish opinion⁹. On the basis the 1979 general election results relative to October 1974, Labour's popularity *increased* in Scotland, as the party gained 5 per cent in votes and 3 additional MPs. The 'Labour unpopularity' thesis rests on dissatisfaction with the party that simply did not occur in Scotland. It is more difficult to validate the hypothesis that devolution was rejected because of the failings of the Yes campaign. It is likely to have been a significant factor and it is consistent with the Europeanisation model described below. Where the latter diverges from the existing argument is in the explanation for the division in the Yes front and the mobilisation or otherwise of the business organisations (which was a key determinant of campaign

⁷ Denver et al. (2000: 28-32) emphasise the former while Surrige and McCrone (1999: 44), Paterson et al. (1992: 634) and Paterson and Wyn Jones (1999) emphasise the latter.

⁸ Table 1.

resources). The existing accounts implicitly explain it as a strategic failure on the part of political leaders due to their personalities and interpersonal ‘chemistry’ with little attention paid to structural factors, which are emphasised in the model proposed here. Last but most importantly, the argument that support for devolution in 1979 was ‘soft’ and was dragged down by the collapse among Conservatives overlooks two crucial points. It is certainly true that demand for devolution, notably among Conservative identifiers, declined rather sharply over the 1978-9 winter and it is plausible that it did so as a result of the increased polarisation of the debate along party lines. However, this explanation misses two crucial points. First, despite the decline in the first few months of 1979, support for self-government – as measured by public preferences on the constitutional status of Scotland – was *still* above 60 per cent at the time of the referendum¹⁰. Second, only 51 per cent of those voters who, despite favouring devolution in principle, voted No to the Scotland Act 1978 were Conservative identifiers¹¹. These accounts thus fail to explain why a large proportion of Scots who were theoretically in favour of devolution voted No in the referendum and why almost half within that proportion did so despite identifying with parties supporting devolution.

More importantly, the explanation offered for whatever consensus was there and, therefore for higher and less volatile support for devolution – the ‘democratic deficit’ – does not fully stand up against the empirical evidence. If we accept that support for devolution at the virtual level was higher in 1997 than in 1979 as a result of the democratic deficit, we should expect five phenomena to have occurred between 1979 and 1997: a sharp decline in the satisfaction with government among non-Conservative identifiers, dissatisfaction with government being a stronger determinant of demand for self-government in 1997 than in 1979, a higher importance of self-government as a political issue and, most of all, a higher virtual demand for devolution. However, there is no evidence that these phenomena took place. First and foremost, the second sharpest decline in the satisfaction with the UK government took place among Conservative identifiers while Nationalists had actually higher satisfaction in 1997 than in 1979¹². Secondly, dissatisfaction with government was a weaker predictor of the demand for self-government in 1997 than in 1979¹³. Thirdly, the perceived importance of self-government as a political issue did not grow between 1979 and 1997; on the contrary it actually declined among both Nationalist and Liberal identifiers¹⁴. Lastly, but most importantly, though support shifted markedly from the assembly option to the

⁹ See Denver et al. (2000: 159).

¹⁰ Table 2

¹¹ Table 3

¹² Table 4.

¹³ Table 5

¹⁴ Table 6

parliament option, virtual support for devolution as a whole actually declined between the two time points from 54 to 43 per cent¹⁵. These results are not consistent with the claim that the higher actual demand for devolution in 1979 was a function of the higher virtual demand for devolved self-government and that, in turn, the latter was primarily determined by the democratic deficit. What can be said is that the devolutionist section of the pro-self-government front was certainly more compact and better organised than in 1979 but this appears only to have had the effect of redistributing preferences ‘internally’ within the two devolution options rather than raising virtual support for devolution as a whole. Moreover, it is important to point out that the ‘79-’97 ‘democratic deficit’ did not create the ‘democratic’ ground for demanding self-government, this was already the central argument used in the 1970s¹⁶; it simply reinforced it. However, it is likely that this reinforcement was primarily felt at the level of elite opinion while, as seen above, both the importance of self-government and overall virtual support for devolution declined at mass opinion level¹⁷.

To summarise, the aspects of credibility and effectiveness of the Yes front emphasised by this argument are likely to have played an important causal role in determining the different results of the two referendums but do not appear to provide, by themselves, a robust answer to the questions they are asked to address. Overall, I claim that this argument, focused on the strength of the underlying demand for self-government, is unable to provide a satisfactory answer to the questions stated above. In light of the above discussion, my critique of the existing explanations of the demand for self-government in 1997 compared to 1979 is twofold, empirical and theoretical. At the empirical level, their hypothesised causal mechanisms do not find supporting evidence in the data on public opinion and behaviour. I contend that this is so because of two theoretical shortcomings. At a general level, an underdeveloped theoretical model of the forces shaping the politics of self-government. More specifically, a focus on domestic factors and a neglect of the external dimension. As a result, these explanations are unable to capture the complexity of the politics of self-government in Scotland. This is the task that the Europeanisation model presented below intends to perform.

¹⁵ Table 7

¹⁶ A ‘democratic deficit’ had also existed in the 1970-74 parliament during which a Conservative government without majority support in Scotland attempted some *ante litteram* Thatcherite policies. For a wider discussion of the ‘democratic motive’ in the 1970s, see Dardanelli (2002: chs 3-5).

¹⁷ This interpretation is consistent with Paterson’s thesis on the ‘mobilisation of the middle class’.

III A Europeanisation model

The model presented in this part explains the variation as a result of the Europeanisation of the politics of self-government between the two points in time and, in particular, its impact on the attitudes towards independence. The model claims that the Europeanisation of the politics of self-government was a necessary though not a sufficient cause for the endorsement of devolution in 1997. This part is organised in four sections. The first section introduces the theoretical basis of the model. Sections 2 and 3 explain the impact of the EU on the politics of self-government in the periods leading up to the two referendums, when the actors' position and their strategies were largely fixed. The fourth section explains what changes that occurred between 1979 and 1997 determined the differences between the two static periods and the referendum results.

3.1 Theoretical basis

The model is based on two central points. First, the existence of a complex nexus between the demand for devolved self-government and the demand for independent self-government and, second, the role played by the European dimension in influencing the latter. I outline these points and their implications below.

Devolution/independence nexus

Self-government was demanded in two different forms: devolution and independence. The two forms could be kept separate at the virtual level – i.e. in opinion polls – but not at the actual level – the referendum vote – when independence was not on offer. This created an 'interaction effect' between virtual demand for devolution and attitudes to independence which determined that actual demand for devolution was to a significant extent a function of the attitudes towards independence. This was so for two reasons. First, the whole politics of self-government had been driven by the rise of the SNP so a close link between devolution and independence was perceived to exist. More specifically, there was a perceived probability that devolution would facilitate secession and therefore that devolution could lead to independence. Actual demand for devolution was thus crucially affected by attitudes to independence conditional on two variables: whether independence was preferred to the status quo or not and whether the probability that devolution would lead to independence was perceived to be higher than 0.5 or not. In presence of these conditions – i.e. status quo preferred to independence and high probability that devolution would lead to independence – there existed a potential large gap between virtual and actual demand for devolution. Large

enough, in fact, as explained below, to turn a 60 per cent support for self-government at the virtual level into a rejection of devolution in the 1979 referendum.

The internal conflict within the pro-self-government front generated by devolutionists preferring the status quo to independence in 1979 also provides a structural explanation for the divisions and the contradictions within the Yes campaign for the referendum, in contrast to accounts that explain it as a failure of instrumental rationality on the part of party leaders.

European dimension and attitudes towards self-government

This aspect relates to the potential of the European dimension to influence attitudes towards self-government. In particular, to influence the perception of independence and thus, on the basis of the nexus explained above, to affect the actual demand for devolution. More specifically, it considers whether elite actors strategically used the structural opportunities/incentives offered by the European Union to improve the costs/benefits balances of devolution and, especially, independence so as to increase the demand for them at the mass public level. In a liberal-democratic, union state such as the UK, the state 'coercive' opposition to secession was always perceived to be minimal. In other words, Scotland had always enjoyed an 'implicit' right to secede from the United Kingdom¹⁸. Therefore, the costs of secession were primarily given by the nature of the international context, in which the European Union was by far the most significant element. The strategic use of Europe was conditional on three variables. At the most immediate level, it was conditional on whether the European Union was perceived in positive terms. At the background level, a positive perception of the European Union was conditional on ideology and on the position of the EU political system relative to the UK and Scotland. When the ideological outlook of the elite actors pursuing self-government was compatible with the properties of the EU system and the latter was perceived as closer to Scotland than the UK, the European Union was perceived in positive terms. In turn, positive perception of the EU opened the way for the use of its structural opportunities/incentives in the pro-self-government strategies. Whether or not the European dimension was exploited was the key variable affecting perceptions of independence hence, indirectly, actual demand for self-government at mass level. On the basis of these two theoretical pillars, the following sections offer an analytic narrative of the politics of self-government in Scotland in the two periods under examination.

¹⁸ On Scotland's 'implicit' right to secede, see Kellas (1999: 224).

3.2 The 'static' period 1974-'79 and the 1979 referendum

In the period 1974-'79, the European dimension had minimal impact on the politics of self-government in Scotland. The self-government 'game' was played entirely within the UK and the pro-self-government front was defeated. This was a result of a number of causally connected elements operating both at the level of elite political actors and of the mass public.

Negative perception of the EU

The first and most fundamental factor was that the key actors pursuing self-government – the SNP, the Labour party and the STUC – had a negative perception of the European Union. They perceived the EU as a 'negative extension' of the UK, i.e. reinforcing the latter's aspects they disliked. This perception was crystallised on two aspects in particular. The type of economic integration pursued by the European Union based on free trade and market liberalisation was perceived as damaging the working classes and the peripheral areas to the advantage of the capital-owners and of the core areas. The supranational character of the EU system and the indirect legitimisation of its policy-making were perceived as leading to further centralisation of power and erosion of democratic accountability. The evidence suggests that the former aspect was the dominant one. The exceptions to this pattern among the pro-self-government actors were the Liberal party, the Church of Scotland and, to a lesser extent, *The Scotsman* and *The Herald*. These actors did not show a perception of the EU as a 'negative extension' of the UK and, especially in the case of the Liberals and the Church, were broadly positive towards it. The stronger relative political power of the SNP, Labour and the STUC vis-à-vis the Liberals, the Church of Scotland and the two newspapers determined that the negative perception of the EU was the dominant one in the pro-self-government camp. The cross-actor variation in the perception of the European Union indicates that ideological factors were the likely determinants. As regards the perception of economic integration, this seems to have been shaped by the conception of the role of government intervention in the economy embodied in the socialist ideology shared, to a varying extent, by the Labour party, the STUC and the SNP and rejected by the Church of Scotland, *The Scotsman* and *The Herald*. This conception was opposed to free trade and market liberalisation for the reasons mentioned above. As regards the perception of political aspects this seems to have been shaped in the case of the SNP by a nationalist ideology based on a monolithic and absolute conception of national sovereignty which was clearly at odds with the exercise of government at the supra-state level. In the case of Labour and the STUC it seems to have also been dictated by the fact that the EU level of policy-making was out of reach for the labour movement and was therefore marginalising it. In sum, due to

ideological factors, the key pro-self-government actors had a negative perception of the EU which was mentally located to the right of the UK system, itself being to the right of Scotland.

EU perceived as irrelevant for self-government

The second element was that, as a result of the perception of the EU described above, the pro-self-government elite actors did not perceive the European Union as having a positive connection with their demand for self-government. In other words, they did not perceive it as a facilitator of self-government, providing incentives/opportunities which could be used to strengthen support for self-government at mass public level. On the contrary, there was a widespread assumption that the European dimension was largely irrelevant for Scottish self-government and, insofar as a connection was identified, this tended to be negative, i.e. seeing the process of European integration as being antithetical to the quest for Scottish self-government. The opposite perception, of regional self-government being a logical consequence of or even a counterbalance to supra-state integration was confined to the academic circles and to the most 'intellectual' and analytically-minded political actors. Importantly, the prevailing perception of a negative association between integration and self-government was shared by the pro- and anti- self-government fronts. The former saw Scottish self-government as antithetical to integration because integration was perceived as a process of further political centralisation and economic liberalisation which was most damaging for peripheral regions such as Scotland. The latter also saw them as being in contradiction on the grounds that European integration was an outward-looking, internationalist project while Scottish self-government was an inward- and backward-looking one. In the eyes of the anti-self-government actors – especially business organisations – the very nature of the process of supra-state integration was delegitimising the demand for self-government at sub-state level. The most important determinant of this perception is, again, to be found in the ideological framework with which pro-self-government actors perceived European integration and in the relative positions of the EU and UK political systems in relation to Scotland.

EU dimension not exploited

The third element was that, as a result of the two preceding ones, the pro-self-government actors – again with the exception of the CoS – did not use the European dimension in their strategies to secure self-government. They could not successfully exploit something they perceived as antithetical to their cause. As the European dimension was not incorporated in their strategies, the self-government game between the pro and anti fronts was played entirely within the UK dimension. However, in the UK dimension the pro-self-government front was at a structural disadvantage vis-à-vis its opponent due to the split between the

objectives of devolution and of independence. The demand for independence, perceived as associated with the rise of the SNP, had been the driving force of the whole politics of self-government in Scotland and the Labour's policy of devolution had been developed in *competition* with the Conservatives' preference for the status quo but *against* the SNP's independence policy. This determined that the conflict intensity was actually higher *within* the pro-self-government front than *between* the latter and the anti-self-government front. Such conflict intensity was clearly displayed during the 1979 referendum campaign. The anti-self-government actors fully exploited the conflict within the pro front by exposing their contradictions and by focusing on the links between devolution and secession. The explanation proposed here is that the divisions and the contradiction in the Yes campaign were largely the result of mid-term structural factors such as the nature of party competition and the shape of the preference distribution at mass level which left almost no margin for manoeuvre to short-term actors agency. The pro-self-government actors played the self-government game only within the UK dimension and, as explained below, lost.

Negative perception of the EU and hostility towards independence at mass level

These elements operating at the elite actor level produced a number of consequences at the mass public level. At the most general level, support for self-government was associated with hostility towards the European Union. The perception of the latter as a 'negative extension' of the UK had thus filtered through from the elite to the mass level. Secondly, support for the weaker form of self-government – devolution – was associated with higher hostility towards the stronger form of self-government – independence – than towards the status quo. The status quo was thus preferred to independence by those supporting devolution. Again, the pattern existing among the elite actors had been transposed at the mass public level.

The interaction effect

This distribution of preferences, and, in particular, the preference ordering among virtual supporters of devolution produced an 'interaction effect' that turned positive virtual support into negative actual support for devolution. This was so because as a result of the fact that the whole politics of self-government had been driven by the rise of the secessionist SNP, devolution was perceived as being linked to independence and possibly a 'stepping stone' to the latter. Given the hostility towards independence, the preference ordering can be written as follows:

$D > SQ > I = \text{devolution preferred to status quo but status quo preferred to independence.}$

With as a consequence actual support for devolution determined as follows:

$$ADd = [VDd f (Ud - Usq) - p(Ui - Usq)] + \{VDi f [Ui - (Ud + Usq)]p \} \text{ with } U^* = (B^* - C^*)^{19}$$

This was a 'destructive' interaction effect in which hostility to independence undermined actual support for devolution, even if, of course, independence was not as such an issue in the referendum. Those favouring the lowest option of self-government – the assembly option – were also the ones most opposed to independence and, therefore, the ones whose referendum vote was most liable to be influenced by the fear of secession. As table 3 shows, a majority of those virtually in favour of the option on offer actually voted No in the referendum. I would argue that this was so because assembly supporters thought devolution would lead to independence and they had a much more negative opinion of the latter than of the status quo. If faced with the ultimate choice between status quo and independence, they preferred the status quo. Hostility to independence thus produced, via the interaction effect, the extraordinary outcome that devolution was sunk in the 1979 referendum by its core supporters!

3.3 The 'static' period 1988-1997 and the 1997 referendum

In sharp contrast to the 1970s, the European Union had a very significant impact on the politics of self-government in Scotland in the 1990s. The evidence suggests that the incorporation of the European dimension in the politics of self-government was the single most important factor accounting for the endorsement of devolution in 1997 relative to the 1979 rejection. As for the previous period, this was a result of a number of causally connected elements operating both at the level of elite political actors and of the mass public.

Positive perception of the EU

The first element was that the pro-self-government actors had a positive perception of the European Union. This perception regarded four aspects in particular: economic integration, supra-state governance, saliency of the EU and respective positions of the EU and UK relative to Scotland. Economic integration was seen as positive in its own right and in relation to Scottish interests, despite lingering concerns about Scotland's peripherality, so that on the whole the single market was perceived as having been beneficial for Scotland.

¹⁹ ADd: actual demand for self-government; VDd: virtual demand for devolution; VDi: virtual demand for independence; Ud: utility of devolution; Usq: utility of the status quo; Ui: utility of independence; p: probability that devolution would lead to independence; U*: generic utility; B*: generic benefits; C*: generic costs.

Supra-state governance was seen as a necessary feature of a modern political order in Europe, in particular in the new post-Cold War order and vis-à-vis the process of globalisation, though, again, concerns with specific aspects such as the EMU criteria of the Maastricht Treaty were still present. The EU institutions were seen as the top tier of the EU multi-level political system in which regional governments had a prominent place and state governments were no longer the only players. Finally, but most importantly, the EU system was seen in a more positive light than the UK. The EU was then perceived to be to the left of the UK system and therefore closer to Scottish preferences than the latter and the positive aspects of the European Union were contrasted against the shortcomings of the Conservative-ruled UK in a way that the former was constructed as a 'positive alternative' to the latter, rather than as a 'negative extension'. In this light, the shortcomings of the EU such as the agricultural policy or the so-called 'democratic deficit' were by then seen as 'problems to be resolved' rather than 'reasons to leave'. This had two effects. First, it led to a radical reassessment of the relevance of the European Union for self-government in Scotland. From being perceived as a threat to Scotland, the European Union came to be perceived as an opportunity for Scotland. More particularly, the EU came to be perceived as a facilitator of self-government, providing incentives and offering opportunities for both independence and devolution. Second, this perception created a difference between the pro-self-government actors – united in their positive perception of the EU's shift to the left – and their opponents who only retained a positive perception of the economic component of integration but turned hostile to the political aspects. In sum, the European dimension was perceived positively by the pro-self-government actors and this perception was a factor of unity among them vis-à-vis the anti-self-government actors.

Awareness of EU's opportunities/incentives

The second element was that, as a result of the perception described above, the pro-self-government actors were by then well aware of the incentives and opportunities the EU was offering for both independence and devolution. With regard to independence, the SNP identified four key aspects, the first three providing incentives and the fourth offering an opportunity.

First, a wide range of policy-making competences that had previously been exercised at the state level was by then exercised at the Union level. Second, the key institutional actor at that level was still – if not even more so²⁰ – the Council of Ministers in which only state

²⁰ It could be argued that the Council of Ministers and the European Council have actually increased their power over time against the Commission and the Parliament considered as a unitary, supra-state actor; on the decline of the Commission, see Tsebelis and Garrett (2000: 25-6).

governments are represented. Third, the entire institutional structure of the EU was biased in favour of the small states which are over-represented in the key institutions of the Commission, Parliament and Council²¹ and have a right of veto in the latter over a wide range of policy areas. Taken together, these three politico-institutional factors were providing powerful incentives for acquiring statehood, the only constitutional status which would have allowed Scotland to fully benefit from the EU institutional environment. In the eyes of the SNP, they were thus providing *additional* reasons for demanding independence. The fourth pertained to the economic sphere and was constituted by the fact that the EU provided a customs union and a single internal market. The customs union and the single market would guarantee free trade and regulatory continuity in the economic relationship between an independent Scotland and the rest of the EU, in particular between an independent Scotland and the rest of the UK. This aspect was perceived by the SNP as dramatically lowering the economic costs for Scotland of seceding from the UK. It was thus offering the *opportunity* to acquire independence without many of the costs traditionally associated with such a move. For the SNP this was the most powerful of the facilitating aspects of the EU.

With regard to devolution, the Labour party and the other devolutionist actors identified three main aspects. The first two provided incentives and the last one offered an opportunity. First, the wide range of policy-making competences exercised at the Union level was also identified by the devolutionists as sharpening the need for adequate representation of Scottish interests at that level. On the assumption that only a devolved government which also retained access to the UK level would be in a position to do so, the pro-devolution actors perceived this aspect as providing an incentive to acquire a devolved government for it was giving *additional* reasons for demanding it. In other words, not only was devolution necessary to properly govern Scotland but also to properly represent it at the Union level. Second, the constraints placed by EU rules on the extent to which state governments could intervene in the economy created a keener need for governmental action at the regional level. Again on the assumption that only a devolved government would be able to perform this function, the devolutionists perceived this aspect as providing an *additional* reason for demanding devolution. Finally, the widespread rhetoric about the idea of a 'Europe of the Regions', with institutional aspects linked to it such as the establishment of the Committee of the Regions and the adoption of the principle of subsidiarity, and the high profile of many processes of regionalisation across Europe, were perceived as providing ample legitimation

²¹ An independent Scotland would have its own commissioner and ECJ judge, 16 instead of 8 MEPs and 3 votes in the Council under pre-Nice qualified-majority voting.

for the demand for regional self-government in Scotland. The establishment of the Committee of the Regions generated expectations that regions would play a much more prominent role in the EU's policy-making while the principle of subsidiarity gave powerful normative justification to the idea that power could and should be devolved from state governments to regional governments. By tying the concept of regional government to the process of European integration – the modernist European political project *par excellence* – the idea of a 'Europe of the Regions' removed the inward- and backward- looking label of the former and, in stark contrast to the 1970s, made it part of the contemporary *zeitgeist*. In the eyes of the pro-devolution actors, this aspect provided powerful legitimation for their demands and thus offered a welcome *opportunity*.

Strategic use of 'Europe'

The third element, following from the elite actors' acute awareness of what the European dimension was offering, is that they made full use of it in their strategies. The foremost example of this is provided by the SNP which made the fullest possible use of the European dimension, re-centring its secession strategy on it, in the formula of 'Independence in Europe', and using those aspects of the EU discussed above as a two-pronged rhetorical argument underpinning it. The SNP which had been opposed to membership of the European Union throughout the 1970s started to modify its approach in the early 1980s and from 1988 campaigned on a policy of 'Independence in Europe' based on the guarantee that an independent Scotland would enjoy member state status in the European Union.

This appears to have been a calculated move by the SNP based on the realisation that the European dimension gave a structural advantage to their independence option vis-à-vis the status quo and, to a lesser extent, devolution. The new policy exploited the opportunities provided by the EU in the political, economic and symbolic spheres identified above to attract higher support for independence – and for the party – at mass public level. The evidence suggests that the opportunity to reduce the economic costs of secession provided by the EU was the most important factor behind the SNP's strategy, but the institutional incentives played an even more prominent 'presentational' role. The SNP exploited them on the grounds that the new, Europeanised version of independence had a much more favourable costs/benefits balance than the old version proposed in the 1970s. By placing independence in the context of the EU, the SNP shifted its constitutional policy towards the centre of the political spectrum and succeeded in making it look mainstream. The resulting acceptability of independence thus triggered a re-shaping of party competition on self-government by forcing the other parties to react to the competitive challenge posed by the new SNP's policy.

The strategic advantage gained by the SNP with the adoption of the 'Independence in Europe' policy produced two effects. On the one hand, all the other actors responded to this challenge by incorporating a European dimension in their respective constitutional policies with Labour and the other devolutionist actors exploiting those aspects of the EU perceived as facilitating devolution. The evidence indicates that the representation incentive and the 'Europe of the Regions'/subsidiarity legitimisation opportunity were those exploited the most. On the other hand, the devolutionist actors, led by the Labour party, also took the step of shifting their own policies closer to the SNP's by campaigning for a tax-varying parliament and by signing up to the notion of Scottish popular sovereignty within the context of the Constitutional Convention. The overall result was that the politics of self-government was by then also played in a European dimension in which the SNP and, to a lesser extent, Labour – together with the other devolutionist actors – had a structural advantage vis-à-vis the Conservatives. The crucial phase in this repositioning of party strategies and shaping of mass preferences was the 1987-1992 parliament, not by coincidence the same period in which the process of European integration was perceived as taking a giant leap forward and public support for European integration reached a peak across Europe²². Even though the peculiar conditions of that period later changed or disappeared, the re-shaping of perceptions, attitudes and strategies remained largely unchanged until 1997. It is also important to point out that Labour's devolution policy had by then been developed *in competition* with the SNP's 'Independence in Europe' policy *against* the Conservatives' policy of retaining the status quo. In contrast with the 1970s, the conflict intensity was by then clearly higher *between* the pro- and anti-self-government fronts than *within* the former as the united Yes-Yes organisation in the 1997 referendum campaign openly demonstrated. Additionally, the very principle of regional self-government appeared by then to be part of the *zeitgeist*. The anti-self-government front employed the same tactic successfully used in 1979, focusing on the link between devolution and secession, but this time failed to shift the mass public's preferences in any significant way²³. The fact that independence was no longer a frightening prospect is also supported by the decision of the business organisations, in stark contrast with 1979, to keep a low profile during the campaign and do not invest resources in the No side. Business was by that time no more hostile to independence than it

²² Measured by the percentage of respondents regarding their country's membership of the European Union as a 'good thing', support for European integration peaked at 72 per cent in spring 1991, see Eurobarometer Report No. 54

²³ Though it could be argued that it did shift them on the issue of tax-varying powers, forcing a second question on the referendum and lowering support for it. However, the crucial point is that the use of the independence link failed.

was to devolution²⁴. The non-mobilisation of business was an important factor in depriving the No campaign of resources and credibility.

Positive perception of the EU and high support for independence at mass level

The strategic use of the European dimension by the elite actors had a profound effect on public opinion in two ways that mirrored the changes that took place at the elite level. First, perception of the EU among those supporting self-government became positive, in other words, support for the EU was by then associated with demand for self-government. This concerned the perception of economic integration, the attitudes towards the EU's social policy and the perception of the EU relative to the UK. The elite perception of the EU as a 'positive alternative' to the UK had filtered through to the mass public level. The elite actors' success in influencing public opinion was a necessary step in their strategy of utilising the European dimension to strengthen the demand for self-government as it would have been impossible for them to do so had the EU still been perceived in negative terms by the Scots. In the case of the SNP, in particular, it would have been virtually impossible to rally support around its policy of 'Independence in Europe' if 'Europe' had not been perceived as a better alternative to Britain. As mass public awareness of European issues was very limited, the strategies of those 'self-government entrepreneurs' acted as the vital link between the development of European integration and the public preferences on self-government in Scotland.

The second effect was that the whole preference distribution on self-government shifted markedly towards the independence end of the spectrum with a tax-raising Parliament being the modal preference and 'Independence in Europe' being the second preference overall and, crucially, among those supporting devolution as first preference. Specifically, supporters of devolution in general, and Labour identifiers in particular, were almost twice as likely to prefer independence to the status quo and only Conservative identifiers expressed a reverse preference. The impact of the European dimension on this is clearly displayed by the variation between support for secession from *both* the UK and the EU, which only increased by 2 percentage points between 1979 and 1997, and support for secession from the UK *but* retention of membership of the EU, which increased by 26 percentage points, within overall support for independence rising five-fold to 35 per cent²⁵. In particular, support for independence rose from 4 to 36 per cent among Labour identifiers and from 37 to 72 per cent among Nationalist identifiers, becoming by far the first preference among the latter. This

²⁴ See Dardanelli (2002: ch 4)

²⁵ See figure 2 in the appendix.

seems to indicate that, of all the elements of the European dimension used strategically by the pro-self-government actors, the one that most clearly 'filtered' through to shape constitutional preferences at mass public level was the reduction in the costs of independence, which likely determined the high level of support for the option of independence in Europe. Those more 'sophisticated' aspects of the European dimension, which were primarily intended to impact on the demand for devolution, did not enjoy high visibility. The low profile of the European dimension in the media is also consistent with this conclusion as no media outlet was supporting independence.

Interaction effect neutralised

Reversing the 1979 pattern, independence was by then preferred to the status quo by those supporting devolution. The shape of the distribution of constitutional preferences in the 1990s, with the end of support for devolution being associated with preference for the status quo vis-à-vis independence, had the effect of neutralising the 'interaction effect' between devolution and independence that had caused the rejection of devolution in 1979. This was so despite the fact that devolution was *still* perceived to be likely to lead to independence. This was so because most virtual supporters of self-government had nothing to lose by voting Yes in the 1997 referendum. In the best scenario they would get devolved self-government in the worst scenario they would get independent self-government but both scenarios were preferable to the default condition in the first place. The end result was that the gap between virtual and actual support for devolution was minimal and the large majority support at virtual level was translated in an almost equally large endorsement of the *White Paper* in the referendum. In contrast to the 1970s, the pro actors played the self-government game on two levels, the UK and the EU ones, and, by fully exploiting the structural advantages offered by the latter, won.

3.4 The 'dynamic' period 1979-1988

What explains the changes in the impact of the European Union on the politics of self-government in Scotland between 1979 and 1997? A number of factors across the three political levels – EU, UK, Scotland – evolved in a way that determined the changes in the EU's impact described above. I discuss each of these factors below starting with changes at the EU level, then changes at the UK level and finally changes at the Scottish level.

Evolution of EU political system

Four main aspects of the EU system underwent significant transformations between the two time points. First, the level of economic integration in the EU's internal market deepened as

a result of the single market programme which eliminated most technical barriers to cross-border trade and increased the ease of movement for both capital and labour. This moved the EU further away from being little more than a free-trade area and towards being an integrated single market. A more deeply integrated internal market provided higher guarantees for maintaining cross-border economic activities, which had a particular relevance to the scenario in which a border could be established between Scotland and the rest of the UK. In other words, the deepening of economic integration further reduced the economic costs associated with secession. Second, political integration also widened and deepened considerably, both horizontally and vertically²⁶. Horizontally, the competences of the EU expanded very significantly in policy areas hitherto reserved to the state level. Vertically, the reaches of the policy output of the Union level penetrated and influenced the political systems of the constituent states to a much greater extent than before, the phenomenon called Europeanisation. This widening and deepening of political integration raised the importance of the EU as a policy-making forum and thus raised the saliency of the representation of Scottish interests which has been described above as one of the key incentives the EU provides for self-government. Given the continuing pre-eminence of the Council, such incentive affected especially the option of independent self-government vis-à-vis devolved self-government. The expectations that regions could play a significant role in EU policy-making quickly died out after the Committee of the Regions had been set up in 1994, thus reinforcing the attractiveness of the 'state' status vis-à-vis a 'region' status for Scotland.

Third, the European Union developed substantial social and regional policies which moved the policy output of the Union leftwards and which contributed significantly to dispel the image of the EU as a purely *laissez faire*, capitalist organisation. By becoming a more 'friendly' political system in the eyes of the left-of-centre opinion – which was dominant in Scotland –, the EU was offering the opportunity to add a positive external dimension to the demand for regional self-government²⁷. Finally, the process of integration became increasingly associated with the idea of 'Europe of the Regions' by which regional governments would acquire a pre-eminent position in the multi-level EU system. This association went beyond the mere rhetorical level and took concrete institutional manifestations such as the establishment of the Committee of the Regions and, especially, the adoption of the principle of subsidiarity as a general guiding principle for the exercise of power in the EU. It was also mirrored by processes of regional devolution of power under

²⁶ See Pollack (1994).

way in several EU states over the same period of time. The combined effect of this movement was to place the individual demands for self-government in a Europe-wide framework and to associate them to the process of integration. This provided a powerful legitimisation for regional self-government and offered elite political actors pursuing it a very attractive opportunity to increase the internal legitimacy of their demands.

Evolution of UK political system

At the UK level, two trends had a significant impact on the dynamics of the connection between European integration and demand for regional self-government. The first one was that the Conservative governments under Margaret Thatcher moved the policy output of the UK system significantly rightwards by aggressively reforming in particular social, regional and fiscal policies²⁸. The second one was that the same Conservative governments also embarked on a process of re-centralisation of the UK system, marked in particular by the emasculation of local government and explicit opposition to the idea of regional governments. This also affected the nature of the union between Scotland and England as the traditional nature of the UK as a union-state appeared to be under threat²⁹. These two trends moved the policy output and the institutional structure of the UK further away from the preferences of the median Scottish voter and thus provided an additional incentive to acquire self-government at the regional level.

Evolution of Scottish actors

Lastly, three crucial changes took place at the Scottish level³⁰. First, the key pro-self-government elite actors – SNP, Labour and the STUC – underwent a deep process of ideological revision in relation to two central issues: the nature of national sovereignty and the role of government in the economy. As regards the former, the revision concerned both a ‘relativisation’ of the idea of sovereignty and a rediscovery of its democratic roots. Perceptions of sovereignty increasingly moved away from a monolithic conception and the

²⁷ On the hegemony of the left in Scotland, see Miller (1983: 108), Field (1997: 27-63) and Pattie et al. (1999: 138); on the influence of social and regional policies in changing perceptions of the EU, see also Ichijo (1999: 213-5).

²⁸ The poll tax was the most extreme example of that trend, for its effect on Scotland see McCrone (1991) and Barker (1992).

²⁹ On the changed approach to the British union on the part of the Conservative party, see Mitchell (1990; 1996b) and Seawright (1996).

³⁰ In the context of the changes at the Scottish level, I also tested the hypothesis that devolution was endorsed because the Conservative identifiers that opposed it died out. There is some support for it but the hypothesis is unable to explain the bulk of the differences between the results of the two referendums. On the one hand, the percentage of voters identifying with the Conservative party did decline sharply between the two points in time. On the other hand, this decline only accounts for 41 per cent of the ‘79/’97 variance in the No vote in the referendum and of course cannot account for the radical changes in the voting pattern of Labour identifiers. The data are not presented here but are available upon request.

idea that sovereignty can be pooled or vertically segmented became widely accepted. Contextually, the idea that sovereignty within Scotland rested with the Scottish people rather than with the UK Parliament equally gained wide acceptance. This revision was instrumental in leading the SNP to abandon its maximalist position of secession from the UK *and* the EU and to reconstruct its constitutional policy around the idea of 'Independence in Europe' and in leading the Labour party and a wide range of interest groups in signing up to the notion of sovereignty of the Scottish people as embodied in the Claim of Rights of 1988. As regards the role of government in the economy, the revision led to a wide acceptance of a liberal 'economic constitution' as a framework for managing the contemporary European economies and thus to a profound reconsideration of the economic role of governments. Taken together these two aspects of the ideological revision of the 1980s had the effect of dramatically changing the perception of economic integration and of the supranational character of the European Union among the nationalist and left-of-centre opinion in Scotland³¹.

Secondly, the rightwards and centre-wards shifts in the UK system, persistently rejected at each elections in Scotland, had the effect of creating a widespread feeling, especially at the elite level, of a 'democratic deficit' in the UK under which the sovereignty of the Scottish people was regularly frustrated by the constitutional structure of the UK. This undermined the case for the constitutional status quo and was an important factor in re-shaping party competition on self-government against the latter.

Thirdly, the decline in primary identification with the UK and the concomitant rise in primary identification with Scotland. This was particularly sharp among Labour identifiers who, as seen above, were also the only group of party identifiers whose voting pattern changed significantly between 1979 and 1997. Moreover, lack of primary identification with the UK was a stronger determinant of the demand for self-government in 1997 than it was in 1979 besides being at both timepoints its most powerful determinant. Such shift in primary identification from the UK to Scotland does not appear to having been influenced by the European dimension, as primary identification with Scotland rather than with the UK was not correlated with any European variable. This shift in primary identification altered the balance between the 'affective' and the 'utilitarian' perception of the UK.

³¹ As mentioned before, the nationalist and left-of-centre opinions overlapped in their perception of the role of government in the economy. On the general ideological change in the European left, see, among others, Thomson (2000); on the change in attitudes towards the European Union see Hix (1999) and Ladrech (2000).

More specifically, it reinforced the utilitarian, contractual approach through which the UK was viewed increasingly on the basis of its 'utility' to Scotland in competition with other institutional arrangements³². Within a utilitarian framework, the capacity of the facilitating elements of the EU to affect preferences was greatly enhanced, given the opportunities and incentives offered in political and economic terms. In other words, the decline in primary identification with the UK left Scottish perceptions of the British union more liable to be influenced by the European dimension.

IV Conclusions

This paper has outlined the puzzle presented by the demand for self-government in Scotland in the 1979 and 1997 referendums relative to its long-term trends. It has then compared the existing explanations of the politics of self-government in Scotland in the period 1974-1997 – which focus on domestic factors – to a three-level Europeanisation model centred on the connection between independence and devolution and the impact of the European dimension on the former. On the basis of the evidence provided, the paper contends that the Europeanisation model provides a more robust explanation than those currently advanced in the literature. More specifically, it is the only model able to explain the outcome of *both* referendums – in presence of a very stable support for self-government throughout the post-war period above 60 per cent – and to account for the complexities of the causal mechanisms determining them. At the core of this model, as its label indicates, there is the role of the European dimension in influencing elite strategies and, indirectly, shaping mass preferences. The claim of this paper is that that role was a necessary condition for the endorsement of devolution in the 1997 referendum.

³² On the long-standing coexistence of the two approaches in Scotland, see Keating (1978) and Fry (1978: 166).

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Tables

Table 1 – Referendum vote by party identification (column %) 1979

Did you vote in the recent referendum on Devolution for Scotland? If yes did you vote 'Yes' or 'No' If no did you favour the 'Yes' side or the 'No' side?						
	Conservative	Labour	Liberal	Nationalist	O/N/D*	All
Voted No	56	24	36	3	29	33
Didn't vote favoured No	12	12	15	4	11	11
(total No)	(68)	(36)	(51)	(7)	(40)	(44)
Didn't vote no preference	4	7	5	4	9	6
Voted Yes	15	39	31	69	32	33
Didn't vote favoured Yes	3	7	6	11	3	6
(total Yes)	(18)	(46)	(37)	(80)	(35)	(39)
Don't know/no answer	10	11	7	9	16	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	222	274	67	75	91	729

Note: *other, none, don't know. Source: Scottish Election Study 1979

Table 2 – Virtual demand for self-government by party identification (column %) 1979

Here are a number of suggestions ³³ which have been made about different ways of governing Scotland. Can you tell me which one comes closest to your own view?					
	Conservative	Labour	Liberal	Nationalist	All
Status quo	40	20	25	5	26
Devolution	46	62	66	45	54
<i>Assembly</i>	29	31	33	9	28
<i>Parliament</i>	17	31	33	36	26
Independence	3	4	2	37	7
Self-government	49	66	67	82	61
Don't know	11	14	8	13	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100
N	222	274	67	75	729

Source: Scottish Election Study 1979

Table 3 – Referendum vote of virtual supporters of an assembly by party identification (column %) 1979

1979: Did you vote in the recent referendum on Devolution for Scotland? If Yes did you vote 'Yes' or 'No' If no did you favour the 'Yes' side or the 'No' side?					
	Conservative	Labour	Liberal	Nationalist	All
Voted No	58	32	32	14	39
Didn't vote favoured No	17	9	23	14	14
(Total No)	(75)	(41)	(55)	(28)	(53)
Didn't vote no preference	1	6	0	14	5
Voted Yes	19	46	41	43	36
Didn't vote favoured Yes	5	7	4	14	6
(Total Yes)	(24)	(53)	(45)	(57)	(42)
Total	100	100	100	99	100
N	65	85	22	7	205

Source: Scottish Election Study 1979

³³ No devolution or Scottish assembly of any sort; Have Scottish Committees of the House of Commons come up to Scotland for their meetings; An elected Scottish assembly which would handle some Scottish affairs and would be responsible to Parliament at Westminster; A Scottish Parliament which would handle most Scottish affairs, including many economic affairs, leaving the Westminster Parliament responsible only for defence, foreign policy and international economic policy; A completely independent Scotland with a Scottish Parliament. I collapsed the first two categories under

Table 4 – Indices of support for the UK 1979/1997

Satisfaction with government:			
1979: How many marks out of ten would you give the following...the Westminster parliament?			
1997: Which of these statements ³⁴ best describes your opinion on the present system of governing Britain?			
Perception of Scotland's welfare:			
1979: Compared with other parts of Britain, would do you say that Scotland was better off or not so well off ?			
1997: Compared with other parts of Britain, would you say that these days Scotland is better off, not so well off or just about the same?			
Identification with the UK:			
1979: Do you consider yourself to be British or Scottish or English or Irish or something else? If you <u>had</u> to choose, which would you say you were?			
1997: Which, if any, of the following ³⁵ best describes how you see yourself?			
	1979	1997	79/97 change
Satisfaction with government*	40	-1	-41
Sat. with govt – Con ID	87	41	-46
Sat. with govt – Lab ID	26	-4	-30
Sat. with govt – Lib ID	46	-14	-60
Sat. with govt – Nat ID	-45	-24	+21
Perception of Scotland's welfare**	-66	-28	+38
Perc. Scot. Welfare – Con ID	-55	3	+58
Perc. Scot. Welfare – Lab ID	-71	-37	+34
Perc. Scot. Welfare – Lib ID	-65	-25	+40
Perc. Scot. Welfare – Nat ID	-78	-39	+39
Identification with the UK***	-16	-58	-42
Ident. UK – Con ID	3	-21	-24
Ident. UK – Lab ID	-22	-66	-44
Ident. UK – Lib ID	-12	-23	-11
Ident. UK – Nat ID	-68	-83	-15

Note: *index varies between -100=complete dissatisfaction and +100=complete satisfaction, 1997 data are relative to General Election; **index varies between -100=100% of respondents thought Scotland was worse off than the rest of the UK and +100=100% of respondents thought Scotland was better off, 1997 data relative to Referendum; ***index varies between -100=primary identification with Scotland and +100=primary identification with the UK, 1997 data relative to Referendum. Sources: Scottish General Election Studies 1979, 1997 and Scottish Referendum Study 1997

Table 5 – Correlation between support for the UK and demand for self-government (gamma values) 1979/1997

	1979	1997
Virtual demand		
Satisfaction with UK government	-.41***	-.21***
Perception of Scotland's welfare	-.25***	-.23***
Identification with the UK	-.40***	-.51***
Actual demand		
Satisfaction with UK government	-.40***	-.29***
Perception of Scotland's welfare	-.25**	-.48***
Identification with the UK	-.49***	-.64***

Note: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05. Sources: Scottish Election Study 1979 and Scottish Referendum Study 1997

the category 'status quo' as there is a wide consensus in referring to devolution as to the establishment of an elected body.

³⁴ See footnote to table 27.

Table 6 – Importance* of self-government 1979/1997

1979: When you were deciding about voting, how important was the general issue of the form of government for Scotland?			
1997: When you were deciding about voting in the general election, how important was this issue - Scottish Parliament - to you? Was it...			
	1979	1997	79/97 Change
Conservative identifiers	144	112	-32
Labour identifiers	154	164	10
Liberal identifiers	174	148	-26
Nationalist identifiers	223	217	-6
All	160	160	0
Correlation with demand (gamma)	.40***	.38***	
N	729	882	

Note: *figures refer to indices of tables 1 and 21; ***p<.001. Sources: Scottish General Election Studies 1979 and 1997

Table 7 – Virtual demand for self-government by party identification (column %) 1979/1997

1979: Here are a number of suggestions ³⁶ which have been made about different ways of governing Scotland. Can you tell me which one comes closest to your own view?										
1997: Which of these statements ³⁷ comes closest to your view... Scotland should?										
	Conservative		Labour		Liberal		Nationalist		All	
	79	97	79	97	79	97	79	97	79	97
Status quo	40	61	20	7	25	35	5	2	26	19
<i>Devolution</i>	46	27	62	53	66	53	45	25	54	43
Assembly	29	-	31	-	33	-	9	-	28	-
Parl. no tax	-	11	-	8	-	18	-	5	-	9
Parliament	17	-	31	-	33	-	36	-	26	-
Parl. with tax	-	16	-	45	-	35	-	20	-	34
<i>Independence</i>	3	9	4	36	2	8	37	72	7	35
Indep. in EU	-	8	-	26	-	8	-	54	-	26
Indep. out EU	3	1	4	10	2	0	37	18	7	9
Self-government	49	36	66	89	67	61	82	89	61	78
Don't know	11	2	14	4	8	4	13	9	13	3
Total	100	99	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	222	123	274	336	67	51	75	122	729	676

Source: Scottish Election Study 1979 and Scottish Referendum Study 1997

³⁵ See table 29; I collapsed the first two categories into a primary identification with Scotland and the latter three into a primary identification with the UK.

³⁶ See footnote to table 3.

³⁷ See footnote to table 24.